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FOCUS ON FEDERAL POWER
The New York Times
Copyright 1995 The New York Times Company
Wednesday, May 24, 1995
Linda Greenhouse
The surprise in the Supreme Court's decision on
term limits on Monday was not the result; ever since
the Court agreed last June to decide the case, it had
been widely assumed that the Justices would find
state-imposed limits on Congressional terms to be
unconstitutional.
Nor did the surprise lie in the divided vote. The
case, argued last November, was the oldest undecided
one on the Court's docket, suggesting that a struggle
of some dimension was under way that would be
unlikely to produce a unanimous ruling.
Rather, the startling aspect of the 5-to-4 decision
in U.S. Term Limits v.Thornton was how close the
Court came to rewriting the script of modem
constitutional law and of long-dominant political
thought.
Justice Clarence Thomas's dissenting opinion,
signed also by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
and by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin
Scalia, would have deposed the Federal Government
from its primary role in the constitutional system and
resurrected the states as the authentic organs of
democratic government.
Taking the opinion at face value, and recognizing
that the Court would not actually go so far in the
crucible of a real case, it is only a slight exaggeration
to say that the dissent brought the Court a single vote
shy of reinstalling the Articles of Confederation, the
affiliation of sovereign states that the Constitution
replaced with the Federal system in 1789.
"It is hard to overstate the importance of how
close they came to something radically different from
the modern understanding of the Constitution," Prof
Laurence H. Tribe of Harvard Law School said in an
interview.
Furthermore, it is barely a month since the same
four Justices, joined then by Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy to make a 5-to-4 majority, ruled in United
States v. Lopez that the authority of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce did not reach as far as it
had been generally assumed for nearly 60 years. The
Court held in that case that Congress did not have the
power to make it a Federal crime to possess a gun
near a school.
The two events - what the Court accomplished in
the Lopez decision and what the dissenters nearly
achieved this week - have together put in play for the
first time in a half-century fundamental questions
about the essential nature of the Federal Government.
While the dissenters fell short this week, they framed
the terms of the debate, retrieving it from the scholarly
journals and think tanks to which it had long been
relegated and placing it center stage at the Supreme
Court.
"The Court is reaching the question at the heart of
it all: Did we authorize all this government?" said
Roger Pilon, an enthusiastic supporter of the Court's
new focus who runs the Center for Constitutional
Studies at the Cato Institute, an influential libertarian
research organization here.
Cheerfully conceding in an interview today that
the underlying question was one of the legitimacy of
the national government, Mr. Pilon said: "When you
ask the question 'by what authority?' you are asking
the most fundamental question in law and in politics.
And it's absolutely consistent with the mood of the
country that wants to get Washington off our backs."
Justice John Paul Stevens, the 75-year-old liberal
Republican who wrote the majority opinion striking
down state-imposed term limits, is really the Court's
"most reactionary member," Mr. Pilon said, because
"he is defending the ancien regime" of centralized
Federal power that is enshrined in the Court's modern
precedents. He added that Justice Thomas, at the age
of 47 the Courts youngest member, was "speaking for
the future" in his states' rights dissent.
Whether that is an accurate forecast of the Court's
balance of power depends in part on where Justice
Kennedy casts his vote as the debate continues to
unfold and, more saliently as the 1996 Presidential
election approaches, on future appointments to the
Court.
It is a measure of how unexpected has been the
emergence of the Court's debate over Federal power
that no recent Supreme Court nominee has been asked
more than a passing question about the issue during
the confirmation process.
Confirmation hearings that have examined in
excruciating detail constitutional questions ranging
from the right to privacy to the authority of the
President to deploy troops have understandably
skipped issues that have appeared firmly settled since
the New Deal, like the scope of Federal authority over
the economy.
But the last few weeks at the Court have virtually
guaranteed that this omission will not continue. The
next "litmus test" for judicial confirmation could
easily be the vigor with which a nominee endorses the
dissenting Justices' statements in the term-limits case
that "the Federal Government's powers are limited and
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enumerated" and that "the ultimate source of the
Constitution's authority is the consent of the people of
each individual state, not the consent of the
undifferentiated people of the nation as a whole."
"This is a Court that is reopening first principles,"
Prof Paul Gewirtz of Yale Law School said in an
interview. Both Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion in the Lopez case and Justice Thomas's
dissent on Monday used the phrase "first principles,"
Professor Gewirtz noted.
What those first principles are, in fact, is the heart
of the debate. "Some of what Justice Thomas thinks of
as first principles were actually the first principles of
those who opposed ratification of the Constitution,"
Professor Gewirtz said. He noted that Patrick Henry,
an opponent of ratification who once declared, "I am
not really an American, I am a Virginian," demanded
at the Virginia ratifying convention in 1788, "Who
authorizes the gentlemen to speak the language of 'we
the people' instead of 'we the states?' "
"We the people of the United States" is, of course,
the opening phrase of the preamble of the
Constitution. Justice Stevens, in his majority opinion
in the term-limits case, cited the preamble for another
of its famous phrases, "a more perfect union."
But the Court is so divided on the basic question
of national structure and identity that even the
Constitution's preamble, a paragraph so familiar as to
strike modern readers as platitudinous, provided no
common ground between the majority and the dissent.
Justice Thomas noted in a footnote to his
dissenting opinion that as originally drafted at the
Philadelphia convention, the opening phrase was "We
the people of the states of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts" and so on, and that the phrase "the
United States" is used throughout the Constitution
"consistently as a plural noun."
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EXCERPTS FROM THE
SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN TERM-LIMITS CASE
The New York Times
Copyright 1995 The New York Times Company
Tuesday, May 23, 1995
Following are excerpts from the Supreme Court's
ruling today in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, holding
that states may not limit the terms of their representatives
in Congress. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the majority
opinion, which was joined by Justices David H. Souter,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer and Anthony
M. Kennedy, who also filed a concurring opinion. Justice
Clarence Thomas wrote the dissenting opinion, which
was joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and by
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia.
FROM THE DECISION
By Justice Stevens
The Constitution sets forth qualifications for
membership in the Congress of the United States. Article
I, §2, cl. 2, which applies to the House of
Representatives, provides:
No person shall be a representative who shall not
have attained to the Ageof twenty-five years, and
been seven years a citizen of the United States, and
who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that
state in which he shall be chosen.
Article I, §3, cl. 3, which applies to the Senate, similarly
provides:
No person shall be a senator who shall not have
attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years
a citizen of the United States, and who shall not,
when elected, be an inhabitant of that state for which
he shall be chosen.
Today's cases present a challenge to an amendment
to the Arkansas State Constitution that prohibits the name
of an otherwiSe-eligible candidate for Congress from
appearing on the general election ballot if that candidate
has already served three terms in the House of
Representatives or two terms in the Senate. The Arkansas
Supreme Court held that the amendment violates the
Federal Constitution. We agree with that holding. Such a
state-imposed restriction is contrary to the "fundamental
principle of our representative democracy," embodied in
the Constitution, that "the people should choose whom
they please to govern them." Powell v. McCormack
(1969). Allowing individual states to adopt their own
qualifications for Congressional service would be
inconsistent with the framers' vision of a uniform national
legislature representing the people of the United States. If
the qualifications set forth in the text of the Constitution
are to be changed, that text must be amended.
I.
At the general election on November 3, 1992, the
voters of Arkansas adopted Amendment 73 to their state
Constitution. Proposed as a "Term Limitation
Amendment," its preamble stated:
The people of Arkansas find and declare that elected
officials who remain in office too long become
preoccupied with re-election and ignore their duties
as representatives of the people. Entrenched
incumbency has reduced voter participation and has
led to an electoral system that is less free, less
competitive and less representative than the system
established by the Founding Fathers. Therefore, the
people of Arkansas, exercising their reserved
powers, herein limit the terms of the elected
officials...
Section 3, the provision at issue in these cases,
applies to the Arkansas Congressional delegation. It
provides:
(a) Any person having been elected to three or more
terms as a member of the United States House of
Representatives from Arkansas shall not be certified
as a candidate and shall not be eligible to have
his/her name placed on the ballot for election to the
United States House of Representatives from
Arkansas.
(b) Any person having been elected to two or more
terms as a member of the United States Senate from
Arkansas shall not be certified as a candidate and
shall not be eligible to have his/her name placed on
the ballot for election to the United States Senate
from Arkansas.
On November 13, 1992, respondent Bobbie Hill, on
behalf of herself, similarly situated Arkansas "citizens,
residents, taxpayers and registered voters" and the
League of Women Voters of Arkansas, filed a complaint
in the Circuit Court for Pulaski County, Arkansas,
seeking a declaratory judgment that §3 of Amendment
73 is "unconstitutional and void." Her complaint named
as defendants then-Governor Clinton, other state
officers, the Republican Party of Arkansas and the
Democratic Party of Arkansas. The State of Arkansas,
through its Attorney General, petitioner Winston Bryant,
intervened as a party defendant in support of the
amendment. Several proponents of the amendment also
intervened, including petitioner U.S. Term Limits Inc.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the
Circuit Court held that §3 of Amendment 73 violated
Article I of the Federal Constitution.
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With respect to that holding, in a 5-to-2 decision, the
Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. . .
The State of Arkansas, by its Attorney General, and
the intervenors petitioned for writs of certiorari. Because
of the importance of the issues, we granted both petitions
and consolidated the cases for argument. We now affirm.
II.
As the opinions of the Arkansas Supreme Court
suggest, the constitutionality of Amendment 73 depends
critically on the resolution of two distinct issues. The first
is whether the Constitution forbids states from adding to
or altering the qualifications specifically enumerated in
the Constitution. The second is, if the Constitution does
so forbid, whether the fact that Amendment 73 is
formulated as a ballot access restriction rather than as an
outright disqualification is of constitutional significance.
Our resolution of these issues draws upon our prior
resolution of a related but distinct issue: whether
Congress has the power to add to or alter the
qualifications of its members.
Twenty-six years ago, in Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486 (1969), we reviewed the history and text of the
Qualifications Clauses in a case involving an attempted
exclusion of a duly elected member of Congress. The
principal issue was whether the power granted to each
house in Art I, §5, to judge the "qualifications of its own
members" includes the power to impose qualifications
other than those set forth in the text of the Constitution.
In an opinion-by Chief Justice Warren for eight members
of the Court, we held that it does not....
Though recognizing that the Constitutional
Convention debates themselves were inconclusive, see
id., at 532, we determined that the "relevant historical
materials" reveal that Congress has no power to alter the
qualifications in the text of the Constitution....
We also recognized in Powell that the
post-convention ratification debates confirmed that the
framers understood the qualifications in the Constitution
to be fixed and unalterable by Congress. For example, we
noted that in response to the antifederalist charge that the
new Constitution favored the wealthy and well-born,
Alexander Hamilton wrote:
"The truth is that there is no method of securing
to the rich the preference apprehended but by
prescribing qualifications of property either for those
who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part
of the power to be conferred upon the national
Government. . . . The qualifications of the persons
who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked
upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the
Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature.",
quoting The Federalist No. 60. . .
In Powell, of course, we did not rely solely on an
analysis of the historical evidence, but instead
complemented that analysis with "an examination of
the basic principles of our democratic system." We
noted that allowing Congress to impose additional
qualifications would violate that "fundamental
principle of our representative democracy . . 'that
the people should choose whom they please to
govern them.' ". quoting 2 Elliot's Debates 257 (A.
Hamilton, New York). . . .
We recognized the critical postulate that sovereignty
is vested in the people, and that sovereignty confers on
the people the right to choose freely their representatives
to the national Government....
Powell thus establishes two important propositions:
first, that the "relevant historical materials" compel the
conclusion that, at least with respect to qualifications
imposed by Congress, the framers intended the
qualifications listed in the Constitution to be exclusive;
and second, that that conclusion is equally compelled by
an understanding of the "fundamental principle of our
representative democracy . . . 'that the people should
choose whom they please to govern them.'"
Petitioners argue somewhat halfheartedly that the
narrow holding in Powell, which involved the power of
the House to exclude a member pursuant to Art. I, §5,
does not control the more general question of whether
Congress has the power to add qualifications. Powell,
however, is not susceptible to such a narrow reading.
Our conclusion that Congress may not alter or add to the
qualifications in the Constitution was integral to our
analysis and outcome....
III.
Our reaffirmation of Powell does not necessarily
resolve the specific questions presented in these cases.
For petitioners argue that whatever the constitutionality
of additional qualifications for membership imposed by
Congress, the historical and textual materials discussed
in Powell do not support the conclusion that the
Constitution prohibits additional qualifications imposed
by states. In the absence of such a constitutional
prohibition, petitioners argue, the 10th Amendment and
the principle of reserved powers require that states be
allowed to add such qualifications....
Petitioners argue that the Constitution contains no
express prohibition against state-added qualifications,
and that Amendment 73 is therefore an appropriate
exercise of a state's reserved power to place additional
restrictions on the choices that its own voters may make.
We disagree for two independent reasons. First, we
conclude that the power to add qualifications is not
within the "original powers" of the states, and thus is not
reserved to the states by the 10th Amendment. Second,
even if states possessed some original power in this area,
we conclude that the framers intended the Constitution
to be the exclusive source of qualifications for members
of Congress, and that the framers thereby "divested"
states of any power to add qualifications.
The "plan of the convention" as illuminated by the
historical materials, our opinions and the text of the 10th
Amendment, draws a basic distinction between the
powers of the newly created Federal Government and the
powers retained by the pre-existing sovereign states. .
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Contrary to petitioners' assertions, the power to add
qualifications is not part of the original powers of
sovereignty that the 10th Amendment reserved to the
states. Petitioners' 10th Amendment argument
misconceives the nature of the right at issue because that
amendment could only "reserve" that which existed
before. As Justice Story recognized, "the states can
exercise no powers whatsoever which exclusively spring
out of the existence of the national Government, which
the Constitution does not delegate to them. . . . No state
can say that it has reserved what it never possessed."
Justice Story's position thus echoes that of Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819). In
McCulloch, the Court rejected the argument that the
Constitution's silence on the subject of state power to tax
corporations chartered by Congress implies that the states
have "reserved" power to tax such Federal
instrumentalities. As Chief Justice Marshall pointed out,
an "original right to tax" such Federal entities "never
existed, and the question whether it has been surrendered
cannot arise."
With respect to setting qualifications for service in
Congress, no such right existed before the Constitution
was ratified. The contrary argument overlooks the
revolutionary character of the government that the framers
conceived. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the
states had joined together under the Articles of
Confederation. In that system, "the states retained most of
their sovereignty, like independent nations bound together
only by treaties." Wesberry v. Sanders (1964). After the
Constitutional Convention convened, the framers were
presented with, and eventually adopted a variation of, "a
plan not merely to amend the Articles of Confederation
but to create an entirely new national Government with a
national executive, national judiciary, and a national
legislature." In adopting that plan, the framers envisioned
a uniform national system, rejecting the notion that the
nation was a collection of states, and instead creating a
direct link between the national Government and the
people of the United States. . . In that national
Government, representatives owe primary allegiance not
to the people of a state, but to the people of the
nation.
In short, as the framers recognized, electing
representatives to the national legislature was a new right,
arising from the Constitution itself. The 10th Amendment
thus provides no basis for concluding that the states
possess reserved power to add qualifications to those that
are fixed in the Constitution. Instead, any state power to
set the qualifications for membership in Congress must
derive not from the reserved powers of state sovereignty,
but rather from the delegated powers of national
sovereignty. In the absence of any constitutional
delegation to the states of power to add qualifications to
those enumerated in the Constitution, such a power does
not exist...
Finally, state-imposed restrictions, unlike the
Congressionally imposed restrictions at issue in Powell,
violate a third idea central to this basic principle: that the
right to choose representatives belongs not to the states,
but to the people. From the start, the framers recognized
that the "great and radical vice" of the Articles of
Confederation was "the principle of legislation for states
or governments, in their corporate or collective
capacities, and as contradistinguished from the
individuals of whom they consist." The Federalist No.
15. Thus the framers, in perhaps their most important
contribution, conceived of a Federal Government directly
responsible to the people, possessed of direct power over
the people, and chosen directly, not by states, but by the
people.... Ours is a "government of the people, by the
people, for the people." A. Lincoln, Gettysburg Address
(1863). ...
Permitting individual states to formulate diverse
qualifications for their representatives would result in a
patchwork of state qualifications, undermining the
uniformity and the national character that the framers
envisioned and sought to ensure....
IV.
Petitioners argue that, even if states may not add
qualifications, Amendment 73 is constitutional because
it is not such a qualification, and because Amendment
73 is a permissible exercise of state power to regulate
the "times, places and manner of holding elections." We
reject these contentions.
Unlike §§ 1 and 2 of Amendment 73, which create
absolute bars to service for long-term incumbents
running for state office, §3 merely provides that certain
senators and representatives shall not be certified as
candidates and shall not have their names appear on the
ballot. They may run as write-in candidates and, if
elected, they may serve. Petitioners contend that only a
legal bar to service creates an impermissible
qualification. , .
We need not decide whether petitioners' narrow
understanding of qualifications is correct because, even
if it is, Amendment 73 may not stand. As we have often
noted, "[clonstitutional rights would be of little value if
they could be . . . indirectly denied." Harman v.
Forssenius (1965), (1944). The Constitution "nullifies
sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes" of
infringing on Constitutional protections. Lane v. Wilson
(1939).
In our view, Amendment 73 is an indirect attempt to
accomplish what the Constitution prohibits Arkansas
from accomplishing directly....
V.
The merits of term limits, or "rotation," have been
the subject of debate since the formation of our
Constitution, when the framers unanimously rejected aproposal to add such limits to the Constitution. The
cogent arguments on both sides of the question that were
articulated during the process of ratification largely
retain their force today. Over half the states have
adopted measures that impose such limits on some
offices either directly or indirectly, and the nation as a
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whole, notably by constitutional amendment, has imposed
a limit on the number of terms that the President may
serve (footnote 49). Term limits, like any other
qualification for office, unquestionably restrict the ability
of voters to vote for whom they wish. On the other hand,
such limits may provide for the infusion of fresh ideas and
new perspectives and may decrease the likelihood that
representatives will lose touch with their constituents. It
is not our province to resolve this longstanding debate.
We are, however, firmly convinced that allowing the
several states to adopt term limits for Congressional
service would effect a fundamental change in the
constitutional framework. Any such change must come
not by legislation adopted either by Congress or by an
individual state, but rather as have other important
changes in the electoral process (footnote 50), through the
amendment procedures set forth in Article V. The framers
decided that the qualifications for service in the Congress
of the United States be fixed in the Constitution and be
uniform throughout the nation. That decision reflects the
framers' understanding that members of Congress are
chosen by separate constituencies but that they become,
when elected, servants of the people of the United States.
They are not merely delegates appointed by separate,
sovereign states; they occupy offices that are integral and
essential components of a single national Government. In
the absence of a properly passed constitutional
amendment, allowing individual states to craft their own
qualifications for Congress would thus erode the structure
envisioned by the framers, a structure that was designed,
in the words of the preamble to our Constitution, to form
a "more perfect union."
FROM THE DISSENT
By Justice Thomas
It is ironic that the Court bases today's decision on
the right of the people to "choose whom they please to
govern them." Under our Constitution, there is only one
state whose people have the right to "choose whom they
please" to represent Arkansas in Congress. The Court
holds, however, that neither the elected legislature of that
state nor the people themselves (acting by ballot
initiative) may prescribe any qualifications for those
representatives. The majority therefore defends the right
of the people of Arkansas to "choose whom they please to
govern them" by invalidating a provision that won nearly
60 percent of the votes cast in a direct election and that
carried every Congressional district in the state.
I dissent. Nothing in the Constitution deprives the
people of each state of the power to prescribe eligibility
requirements for the candidates who seek to represent
them in Congress. The Constitution is simply silent on
this question. And where the Constitution is silent, it
raises no bar to action by the states or the people.
Because the majority fundamentally misunderstands
the notion of "reserved" powers, I start with some first
principles. Contrary to the majority's suggestion, the
people of the states need not point to any affirmative
grant of power in the Constitution in order to prescnbe
qualifications for their representatives in Congress, or to
authorize their elected state legislators to do so.
Our system of government rests on one overriding
principle: all power stems from the consent of the
people. To phrase the principle in this way, however, is
to be imprecise about something important to the notion
of "reserved" powers. The ultimate source of the
Constitution's authority is the consent of the people of
each individual state, not the consent of the
undifferentiated people of the nation as a whole....
When they adopted the Federal Constitution, of
course, the people of each state surrendered some of
their authority to the United States (and hence to entities
accountable to the people of other states as well as to
themselves). They affirmatively deprived their states of
certain powers, and they affirmatively conferred certain
powers upon the Federal Government. Because the
people of the several states are the only true source of
power, however, the Federal Government enjoys no
authority beyond what the Constitution confers: the
Federal Government's powers are limited and
enumerated. In the words of Justice Black, "[tihe United
States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power
and authority have no other source." Reid v. Covert
(1957).
In each state, the remainder of the people's powers,
"[tihe powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states," Amdt.
10, are either delegated to the state government or
retained by the people. The Federal Constitution does
not specify which of these two possibilities obtains; it is
up to the various state constitutions to declare which
powers the people of each state have delegated to their
state government. As far as the Federal Constitution is
concerned, then, the states can exercise all powers that
the Constitution does not withhold from them. The
Federal Government and the states thus face different
default rules: where the Constitution is silent about the
exercise of a particular power, that is, where the
Constitution does not speak either expressly or by
necessary implication, the Federal Government lacks
that power and the states enjoy it.
These basic principles are enshrined in the 10th
Amendment, which declares that all powers neither
delegated to the Federal Government nor prohibited to
the states "are reserved to the states respectively, or to
the people." With this careful last phrase, the
amendment avoids taking any position on the division of
power between the state governments and the people of
the states: it is up to the people of each state to
determine which "reserved" powers their state
government may exercise. But the amendment does
make clear that powers reside at the state level except
where the Constitution removes them from that level. All
powers that the Constitution neither delegates to the
Federal Government nor prohibits to the states are
controlled by the people of each state. .
The Constitution simply does not recognize any
mechanism for action by the undifferentiated people of
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the Nation. Thus, the amendment provision of Article V
calls for amendments to be ratified not by a convention of
the national people, but by conventions of the people in
each state or by the state legislatures elected by those
people. Likewise, the Constitution calls for members of
Congress to be chosen state by state, rather than in
nationwide elections. Even the selection of the President,
surely the most national of national figures, is
accomplished by an electoral college made up of
delegates chosen by the various states, and candidates can
lose a Presidential election despite winning a majority of
the votes cast in the nation as a whole....
In short, the notion of popular sovereignty that
undergirds the Constitution does not erase state
boundaries, but rather tracks them. The people of each
state obviously did trust their fate to the people of the
several states when they consented to the Constitution;
not only did they empower the governmental institutions
of the United States, but they also agreed to be bound by
constitutional amendments that they themselves refused
to ratify. See Art. V (providing that proposed
amendments shall take effect upon ratification by
three-quarters of the states). At the same time, however,
the people of each state retained their separate political
identities. As Chief Justice Marshall put it, "[n]o political
dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down
the lines which separate the states, and of compounding
the American people into one common mass." McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 (1819).
Any ambiguity in the 10th Amendment's use of the
phrase "the people" is cleared up by the body of the
Constitution itself. Article I begins by providing that the
Congress of the United States enjoys "[aill legislative
powers herein granted," § 1, and goes on to give a careful
enumeration of Congress's powers, §8. It then concludes
by enumerating certain powers that are prohibited to the
states. The import of this structure is the same as the
import of the 10th Amendment: if we are to invalidate
Arkansas' Amendment 73, we must point to something in
the Federal Constitution that deprives the people of
Arkansas of the power to enact such measures.
Tne majority disagrees that it bears this burden. But
its arguments are unpersuasive.
The majority's essential logic is that the state
governments could not "reserve" any powers that they did
not control at the time the Constitution was drafted. But
it was not the state governments that were doing the
reserving. The Constitution derives its authority instead
from the consent of the people of the states. Given the
fundamental principle that all governmental powers stem
from the people of the states, it would simply be
incoherent to assert that the people of the states could not
reserve any powers that they had not previously
controlled....
The majority settles on "the Qualifications Clauses"
as the constitutional provisions that Amendment 73
violates. Because I do not read those provisions to
impose any unstated prohibitions on the states, it is
unnecessary for me to decide whether the majority is
correct to identify Arkansas' ballot-access restriction
with laws fixing true term limits or otherwise
prescribing "qualifications" for Congressional office.
The Qualifications Clauses are merely straightforward
recitations of the minimum eligibility requirements that
the framers thought it essential for every member of
Congress to meet. They restrict state power only in that
they prevent the states from abolishing all eligibility
requirements for membership in Congress....
In my view, the historical evidence is simply
inadequate to warrant the majority's conclusion that the
Qualifications Clauses mean anything more than what
they say. .
The people of other states could legitimately
complain if the people of Arkansas decide, in a
particular election, to send a 6-year-old to Congress. But
the Constitution gives the people of other states no basis
to complain if the people of Arkansas elect a freshman
representative in preference to a long-term incumbent.
That being the case, it is hard to see why the rights of the
people of other states have been violated when the
people of Arkansas decide to enact a more general
disqualification of long-term incumbents. Such a
disqualification certainly is subject to scrutiny under
other constitutional provisions, such as the First and
14th Amendments. But as long as the candidate whom
they send to Congress meets the constitutional age,
citizenship and inhabitancy requirements, the people of
Arkansas have not violated the Qualifications Clauses.
... I would read the Qualifications Clauses to do no
more than what they say.
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HIGH COURT BANS STATE-IMPOSED TERM LIMITS FOR CONGRESS
The Associated Press Copyright 1995
Monday, May 22, 1995
Richard Carelli
Washington (AP) - The Supreme Court dealt a
devastating blow to backers of congressional term
limits Monday, ruling in a contentious 5-4 decision
that states cannot limit service in Congress without
amending the Constitution.
Term-limit advocates reacted with anger and
disgust; one said "you can hear the sound of
champagne corks popping" among politicians and
power brokers in Washington. Supporters of limits
promised to press ahead, saying voters will continue to
demand an end to entrenched office holders.
Twenty-two states had taken steps similar to the
Arkansas measure struck down by the court. The
sweeping decision spells doom for all such state efforts.
The court likewise ruled that Congress cannot
impose term limits for its own members by merely
enacting a statute.
"Any such change must come not by legislation
adopted either by Congress or by an individual state
but rather ... through the amendment procedures,"
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the court.
State-imposed term limits for state political offices
are not affected, however.
Passage of a constitutional amendment, disfavored
by some Republican leaders, would be difficult. It
requires a two-thirds vote in each chamber. And once
enacted by Congress, any proposed amendment would
have to be ratified by 38 states.
Congressional reaction to the court's ruling could
loom large as an issue in the 1996 elections.
"We will bring the term-limits constitutional
amendment to the Senate floor at the earliest possible
date," said Sen. Fred Thompson, R-Tenn., a
term-limits supporter.
Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, R-Kan., made
the same pledge.
"Today's ruling suggests a constitutional
amendment will be needed to make congressional term
limits a reality," he said. "We will study the ruling
carefully, review all the options and take the course of
action that will give those who support term limits our
best chance for success."
But Sen. Bob Kerrey, D-Neb., said, "I continue to
believe that term limits are an intrusion on the people's
right to choose their own representatives, and would
place smaller states like Nebraska at a disadvantage."
A disappointed Paul Jacob of U.S. Term Limits
said, "All over Washington, the politicians and power
brokers are happy today. You can hear the sound of
champagne corks popping.
"I have a simple message to them: Drink up.
You're outnumbered. They're going to wake up
tomorrow and find out the American people are still
going to want term limits," Jacob said.
Sig Rogich, a former adviser to President Bush
who led the term-limit movement in Nevada, sounded
a similar theme. "I think it's just one step in the
process," he said of the court ruling. "The American
people overwhelmingly want term limits. Entrenched
incumbency won't stop it. I don't think the Supreme
Court will."
Opponents of term limits point out that voters
already have the power to limit the terms of members
of Congress by simply refusing to re-elect incumbents.
But disgruntled voters who think career politicians
have lost touch with them had made term limits a
political whirlwind since 1990, when Colorado voters
adopted the first measure restricting how long
members of Congress could serve.
The court let the air out of such efforts by the
slenderest of margins.
Stevens' 61-page opinion was joined by Justices
Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.
Justice Clarence Thomas authored a spirited,
88-page dissent, in which he was joined by Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor and Antonin Scalia.
"Nothing in the Constitution deprives the people
of each state of the power to prescribe eligibility
requirements for the candidates who seek to represent
them in Congress," Thomas said. "The Constitution is
simply silent on this question."
But Stevens said the Constitution's framers
rejected an attempt to include such term limits.
The court also rejected the notion that Arkansas'
term-limit measure, which disqualifies someone from
being listed on the state ballot, is really only an
election regulation like many others the Constitution
allows.
Arkansas voters amended their state constitution
in 1992 to limit how many times someone could appear
on the ballot Those who had served two six-year terms
in the U.S. Senate or three two-year terms in the House
could run, but only as write-in candidates.
Besides Arkansas and Colorado, congressional
term limits were approved by Alaska, Arizona,
California, Florida, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming.
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STATES' RIGHTS GAINING GROUND WITH SUPREME COURT
With Justices Closely Split, Advocates Are Only a Vote Away from Reshaping the
Federal-State Relationship
Philadelphia Inquirer Sunday, May 28, 1995
Reprinted by permission: Tribune Media Services
Aaron Epstein
Washington - In the perpetual American power
struggle between the states and the national
government, the momentum is clearly with the states.
With Republicans steering Congress, the nation's
lawmakers are crusading to curb the power of the
federal government - and now the states have gained
solid support at the Supreme Court.
In a pair of 5-4 cases that will be studied and
analyzed in law schools for decades to come, the
justices dealt with bedrock issues that worry many
Americans:
Does the central government wield too much
power over citizens' lives? Does the Constitution
permit the enormous expansion of the federal
government that Americans have witnessed since the
advent of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal?
What may be gleaned from the court's two rulings
- one last week, the other last month - is at least this
much:
The advocates of enhanced states' rights are only
a vote away from reshaping the federal-state
relationship. Right now, though, centrist Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy holds the balance of power, just
as he has in abortion-rights and church-state cases.
And Justice Clarence Thomas, in his fourth year
on the court at age 47, has emerged from the shadow
of Antonin Scalia to become a forceful jurist in his
own right - and, in fact, the most radical of the high
court's conservatives.
On Monday, in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, a
profound.ly divided court slapped down the states.
Neither they nor state voters may restrict the tenure of
U.S. senators and representatives, the court said.
Permitting state-imposed term limits on national
legislators would result in "undermining the uniformity
and the national character that the Framers envisioned
and sought to ensure," declared a one-vote majority
consisting of John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer - and
Kennedy.
A month earlier, in United States v. Lopez, the
court ruled for the first time in 60 years that Congress
had exceeded its power to control interstate commerce.
Congress, the one-vote majority said, had erred by
enacting a law barring anyone from caring a gun near
a school.
Possession of a gun in a local schoolyard is a
problem for the states and is "in no sense an economic
activity that might . . substantially affect any sort of
interstate commerce," declared a majority made up of
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Sandra Day
O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas - and Kennedy.
"What these cases show," observed Michael
Gerhardt, a law professor at the College of William
and Mary, "is that these (federal-state) questions hang
by a thread - Tony Kennedy's vote.
"If he had gone the other way in the term-limits
case, it would have given states an extraordinary power
over federal elections and weakened the Congress,"
Gerhardt said.
Kennedy, appointed by President Ronald Reagan
in 1988, explained in his concurring opinion in the
case that the government in Washington must not
intrude on areas of traditional state concern, such as
education.
In those areas, he said, states and cities must be
allowed to "perform their role as laboratories for
experimentation to devise various solutions."
But at the same time he observed, "There can be
no doubt . . . that there exists a federal right of
citizenship, a relationship between the people of the
Nation and their National Government, with which the
states may not interfere."
And because that national relationship includes a
federal right to vote in a congressional election, the
states cannot be allowed to dictate the number of terms
a U.S. senator or House member may serve, Kennedy
said.
To libertarian intellectuals such as Roger Pilon,
the two rulings in the last month provide hope that the
court will become a partner with Congress - and
perhaps a Republican White House - in the movement
to curb centralized federal power.
"By calling into question the authority of the
federal government, we are preparing the way for the
reemergence of authority at the state and local level
and, more important, for individual responsibility for
solving problems," said Pilon, who directs the Cato
Institute's Center for Constitutional Studies.
Those who, like Pilon, would drastically reduce
federal authority over law enforcement, business,
education, natural resources, the environment, the arts
and other aspects of American life have made an
instant hero of Thomas.
"The notion of popular sovereignty that undergirds
the Constitution does not erase state boundaries, but
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rather tracks them," Thomas wrote in his 88-page
dissent in the term-limits case. "The people of each
state obviously did trust their fate to the people of the
several States when they consented to the
Constitution."
To support his thesis, Thomas noted that the
Constitution provides for members of Congress to be
chosen state by state, a president to be selected by state
delegates to an electoral college, and amendments to
be ratified by state conventions or state legislatures.
"The Constitution derives its authority from the
consent of the people of the States," he concluded.
Pilon said that "the voice of the future is Clarence
Thomas, who is speaking from conviction and in
harmony with the election of 1994 and. . . the era of
returning power to states and to the people."
But to others, such as Gerald Gunther, a Stanford
University constitutional scholar, the voice of Thomas
is merely an echo of the discarded 19th-century view of
the United States as a compact among the states rather
than a unified, indivisible nation.
Gunther, who described himself as "a registered
Democrat who grew up with the New Deal," found it
surprising that Thomas' states-rights philosophy found
as many as three supporters on the court.
"What is troublesome is that O'Connor would fall
for this nonsense," he said. "I'm skeptical that
O'Connor would be willing to go along (with Thomas)
in future cases."
But O'Connor, a former state legislator and state
judge in Arizona, has been urging recognition of states'
rights for a long time.
Ten years ago, when the court reversed itself and
subjected state and local government services to
federal minimum-wage standards, a dissenting
O'Connor described states and localities as "wounded"
by an "unprecedented growth of federal regulatory
activity."
In the same case, Rehnquist predicted in dissent
that the principle of state sovereignty would "in time
command the support of a majority of this court."
That hasn't happened yet -- but it could.
All that is needed to make Rehnquist's prediction
a reality is the election next year of a Republican
president, the departure, say, of Stevens, and his
replacement by a conservative.
Stevens, a liberal Republican who is the court's
oldest justice at 75, wrote the majority opinion that
reined in the popular state term-limits movement - and
limited the reach of the 10th Amendment. That
amendment provides that powers not granted to the
U.S. government nor forbidden to the states are
reserved to the state governments or to the people.
William Van Alstyne, a conservative law
professor at Duke University and author of a
constitutional-law text used in many law schools,
credited both Stevens and Thomas with having written
"the most erudite opinions I've seen in years."
From now on, the professor said, no one should
doubt Thomas' abilities. His U.S. Term Limits dissent
"will dissipate the notion that he's a lightweight
person," Van Alstyne said.
Nor should there be doubts of Thomas' emergence
as a revolutionary of the right, despite his silence at
oral arguments.
Doubters are referred to his lengthy, amply
footnoted opinions urging the court to rip up a
quarter-century of voting-rights decisions and more
than a half-century of federal expansion under the
commerce powers of Congress.
What will happen next in the high court
tug-of-war over the state-federal relationship?
Perhaps a new look at legislation that promises
money to the states on condition that they do certain
things, or unfunded mandates, which require state
programs but provide no money to pay for them.
The justices may want to decide the
constitutionality of the Brady law, which requires a
five-day waiting period for handgun purchases while
officials make background checks of purchasers.
Federal judges in four states have struck down the
law as an unfunded federal intrusion on the authority
of local law enforcement officials. The judges cited the
10th Amendment.
Remarked Professor Gerhardt: "We may have to
revisit a lot of what we thought was settled."
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CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
Ruling Pressures Congress To Address Term Limits
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report
Copyright 1995
Wednesday, May 31, 1995
Holly Idelson
TO ADDRESS TERM LIMITS
Rep. Bob Inglis, R-S.C., once said that asking
Congress to vote for term limits was a bit like asking
the chicken to vote for Colonel Sanders.
Now, that is exactly what it will take to make
congressional term limits the law.
The Supreme Court on May 22 blocked Congress
and the states from passing laws that limit
congressional terms, leaving a constitutional
amendment as the only legitimate route for imposing
such restrictions.
It is not a step that anyone expects Congress to
take eagerly, or soon. Both sides are looking to the
1996 elections as a critical test of the staying power of
the term limits movement. The breadth of popular
support for term limits is not in doubt, only its
intensity: Do voters want term limits enough to make
resistant politicians fight for them, too?
Nearly two dozen states have passed restrictions
on congressional service - limits that would have
begun pruning candidate lists in 1998. Many
politicians doubtless were privately relieved by the
court ruling, although few have showcased an aversion
to term limits. "You can hear the sound of champagne
corks popping," said Paul Jacob, executive director of
one of the national term limits groups.
But by clearing away the state laws, the court
ruling also removed any of the legal uncertainty
shielding Congress from the full force of term limits
agitation. (Story, 1995 Weekly Report p. 1480)
Senators will be the first to test the new climate;
they are expected to vote on a constitutional
amendment on term limits this summer.
In the House, which defeated such an amendment
in March, lawmakers do not expect a new vote until
1997 and the new session. Some are not waiting to get
organized, though, and already have called on Speaker
Newt Gingrich, R-Ga., to form a task force.
Some term limits advocates said the Supreme
Court ruling should help their cause by firing up voters
and making Congress focus on a term limits
constitutional amendment. Before the ruling,
lawmakers espousing support for term limits had been
divided over whether to seek state-imposed restrictions
or uniform national limits. Those who favored
congressional action disagreed over whether to seek a
constitutional amendment or a statute authorizing such
restrictions.
No more, said Rep. Bill McCollum, R-Fla. "We
now have a clear path on what we have to do."
There is ample evidence, moreover, that
politicians still think the issue has clout. Immediately
after the high court issued its ruling, lawmakers
scrambled to present themselves as the true keepers of
the term limits flame.
And Jacob of U.S. Term Limits promised that
disappointed voters would do their part: "What is
anger and frustration today will be votes at the polls in
1996." His group plans to pressure candidates to sign
pledges supporting term limits or to volunteer to step
down after a few terms.
If they are right and voters are willing to reward -
and punish - politicians on this issue, the Supreme
Court ruling may be just a temporary setback for the
term limits cause.
"I think we're one election away from enacting a
term limits amendment to the Constitution," said
George Nethercutt, R-Wash., who defeated former
House Speaker Thomas S. Foley in part on the term
limits issue.
But some lawmakers believe the bulk of the term
limits furor may be spent, with voters satiated by the
change in congressional control and the departures of
several pivotal Democratic incumbents in the 1994
elections.
"It may very well be that this issue has reached its
peak and declined on the other side," said Sen. Slade
Gorton, R- Wash., whose state adopted congressional
term limits that were subsequently invalidated by a
federal judge.
ROAD TO THE COURT
The term limits movement exploded onto the
national political scene in the early 1990s, with
supporters winning ballot initiatives or gaining term
limits laws in 23 states within five years.
Supporters said term limits were the proper
medicine for the gridlock and special interest politics
ailing Washington. The restrictions would ensure a
steady stream of new voices in Congress, they said.
Many voters agreed, approving term limits ballot
initiatives almost everywhere they were proposed.
Still, the movement had strong detractors who said
voters should rotate candidates through the ballot box
and who worried that fixed limits would deprive
Congress of some of its most able and seasoned
lawmakers.
In Arkansas, some of these critics challenged that
state's term limits law and prevailed in the Arkansas
Supreme Court. It was that legal dispute, U.S. Term
Limits Inc. v. Thornton and Bryant v. Hill, that came
before the U.S. Supreme Court.
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The justices weighed in with a 5-4 decision that
abruptly erased not just the Arkansas law, but all the
state-passed limits on congressional terms. The ruling
should not affect laws limiting the terms of state
officeholders. (Story, 1995 Weekly Report p. 1480;
excerpts, p. 1528)
According to the majority opinion, the Founding
Fathers had wanted to give voters a wide choice for
their representatives in Congress. They fixed three
specific qualifications in the Constitution - pertaining
to age, residency and citizenship - and meant that list
to be exclusive.
"Allowing individual states to adopt their own
qualifications for congressional service would be
inconsistent with the Framers' vision of a uniform
national legislature representing the people of the
United States," Justice John Paul Stevens wrote. "If the
qualifications set forth in the constitution are to be
changed, that text must be amended."
CONGRESS IN THE CROSSHAIRS
In theory, state legislatures can begin agitating for
a constitutional convention to adopt a term limits
amendment. But this is a high-energy, high-risk
approach that has never been successful in amending
the Constitution.
Instead, all 27 constitutional amendments have
come through the other route specified in the
Constitution - a two-thirds vote in both houses of
Congress, followed by ratification in three-fourths of
the states.
House Republicans last fall pledged to begin such
an effort as part of their campaign blueprint, the
"Contract With America." But the startling results of
those elections - which toppled some longstanding
Democratic titans and put Republicans in charge of
both chambers - undercut the punch of the term limits
issue.
Once in power, Republicans and term limits
activists fell to bickering over the proper formula for
new restrictions. And when the issue came to the
House floor in March, sponsors fell 61 votes short of
the two-thirds margin needed for passage. (1995
Weekly Report, p. 1005)
Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, R-Kan., also
had promised a floor vote on the issue, and he
reiterated that pledge in the wake of the Supreme
Court ruling.
Several GOP senators said Dole undoubtedly
would face pressure to back off that commitment.
Especially with the amendment dead in the House for
now, they said, many senators would prefer not to be
forced to go on record for or against it. Nevertheless,
they expect Dole to hold the vote.
Sen. Fred Thompson, R-Tenn., a freshman who is
sponsoring the term limits proposal, said he thinks his
legislation will get more votes in the full Senate now
that the court has swept away the possibilities of
state-passed limits or federal legislation authorizing
such restrictions. "I think it will crystallize the issue,"
he said.
Still, supporters are only expecting to lay down a
political base line of support on the issue. They say
they will need a jolt from voters in the 1996 elections
to get within striking distance of the margins needed to
pass a constitutional amendment.
Meanwhile, Sen. Hank Brown, R-Colo., has not
given up on an alternative path.
To get around the daunting two-thirds requirement
of a constitutional amendment, Brown is proposing
legislation to change the definition of state "residency"
for candidates to preclude anyone who spends more
than six months away from home annually for 12
consecutive years - i.e. congressional incumbents.
But many lawmakers and legal scholars were
skeptical such a plan would pass legal muster. In
Thornton, the court said keeping incumbents off the
state ballot was tantamount to saying they could not
run for office. Brown's residency proposal likely would
meet the same fate, said Thomas 0. Sargentich, a
constitutional law professor at American University.
ELECTION FLASHPOINT?
Politicians were quick to try to portray the ruling
to their advantage.
Republican National Committee Chairman Haley
Barbour pointed out that both of President Clinton's
appointees to the court voted to strike down the
state-passed term limits and urged unhappy voters to
take it out on Clinton.
Within the Republican Party, presidential
candidates Pat Buchanan and Lamar Alexander sought
to use the issue against rival candidates Dole and Phil
Gramm, R-Texas.
"Sens. Dole and Gramm should strike while the
iron is hot and schedule a new vote on term limits,"
Alexander said. "If the states can't do it, the fate of
term limits rests squarely on the shoulders of Bob Dole
and Phil Gramm."
As the drive for a constitutional amendment
continues, lawmakers may face heightened pressure to
sign voluntary pledges to step down after a fixed
number of terms.
There was no rush to do so after the court ruling,
however, and many lawmakers have said it would be
unfair to constituents to limit their own terms when
their colleagues do not face similar restrictions.
Some term limits supporters admitted they were
unsure if popular sentiment ran deep enough to make
term limits a major issue in 1996. Critics had their
own doubts.
"I think people are going to lose their enthusiasm
for it," said Sen. Dale Bumpers, D-Ark., a term limits
critic. But he added, "That may be more a wish than a
fact."
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SUPREME COURT RESTORES THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Chicago Tribune
Tuesday, May 2, 1995
Douglas W. Kmiec
The Supreme Court last week decided a truly
landmark case addressed to the structural heart of our
government. While the nominal holding of United
States vs. Lopez is the unconstitutionality of a statute
making possession of a gun within a school zone a
federal crime, it is the underlying legal rationale that is
of potentially monumental significance. Specifically,
Lopez is the first step in nearly 60 years toward the
restoration of a constitutional order premised upon a
national government of enumerated and, therefore,
limited powers.
Perhaps it escaped your notice that the
constitutional order was amiss, although quite frankly,
it is now common wisdom that the federal government
is intruding too greatly in everyday life and family
budget. Less well-known or understood is that
Congress' ability to intrude into virtually any topic
originated in this century with the New Deal and was
hinged uneasily upon an obscure constitutional
provision authorizing Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.
Health care, education, housing, civil rights,
crime, economic redevelopment, land use and the
environment-every one of these subjects and far more
not only has been touched, but also frequently
preempted, by federal law on the theory that each
"affects" - however remotely - interstate commerce.
Now there are two uncomfortable realities about this
theory: first, it's true at its most general level, and
second, the admission of its truth seems to make the
federalist structure envisioned by the Constitution an
impossibility. Because we are ecologically and
economically interdependent, every individual action,
from clearing one's backyard of brush and overgrowth
to allowing one's family merely to consume the wheat
grown on one's own farm, "affects commerce." But if
that be so, every action is potentially, and of late has
been in actuality, the subject of national regulation.
It is constitutionally abnormal to rely upon
centralized, national authority to handle with stiff
uniformity locally diverse, and sometimes, minute
questions. Understandably, this practice gained its
greatest centripetal momentum in abnormal times. The
national economic emergency of the Depression and
the international threat of World War II cried out for
national solution or response. These were ably met,
and as these extraordinary circumstances subsided, it
seemed that the healthy federalist balance of the
original constitutional design would return. As one
Supreme Court justice observed, it was still possible
to speak as recently as the 1950s of a "burden of
persuasion on those favoring national intervention."
Imperceptibly, but inexorably, the burden shifted, and
political administrations of the last 30 years assumed
the existence of national power to address even the
most local subject. The constitutional order was thus
subverted. In the words of Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor in a 1980s dissent, "the extraordinary
become ordinary."
But not without consequence. We see that
consequence most glaringly in the size of the federal
deficit, but until this week, the Supreme Court tended
to overlook the more subtle, and more insidious, costs
of centralization to the constitutional system. While
virtually every piece of federal legislation is intended
to have some good purpose - not unlike the law struck
down in Lopez keeping guns out of schools-a fixation
on finding federal solutions for local problems has
meant a disregard for the political sovereignty of the
states, an acceptance of "one size fits all" answers for
matters better resolved locally or with greater
variation, and in the end, a loss of personal freedom.
Lopez is no cure-all for this. No single, closely
divided 5-4 opinion could be.
The legal riddle of what precisely falls within the
national commerce power has not been solved,
although Lopez supplies some useful clues. It is clear,
for example, that the original understanding of the
commerce power was to create a national economy free
of state-imposed trade barriers. Consistent with this,
Lopez affirms Congress' ability to regulate the
"channels of interstate commerce," such as roads and
navigable waters, as well as "instrumentalities" within
those channels, from trucks to airplanes to the means
of telecommunication. Within this category, too, the
court made plain that Congress retains authority to
keep items out of commerce, including, one can
reasonably speculate, "cop-killer" bullets, assault
weapons and other tools of the terrorist trade.
Less clear is what matters may be regulated by the
national government as having "a substantial relation
to interstate commerce." This is not new language, and
it is within the shadow of the national regulatory
portfolio.
Over the years, various Supreme Court majorities
have tried unsuccessfully to draw distinctions between
direct and indirect effects on commerce. In an earlier
era, the court proposed a line between manufacturing
and commerce, with all production activity argued to
be outside federal power. This conception gave way to
the economic wage and hour reforms of the 1930s and
thereafter. For a short time in the 1970s and early
1980s, the court tried to limit the burgeoning scope of
federal power by reference to the 10th Amendment,
which reserves unenumerated authority to the states.
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But somewhat impatiently after less than a decade, the
court abandoned the effort to define "traditional state
functions," and unrealistically told members of
Congress that it was up to them to be sensitive to
federalism. Not surprisingly, Congress found itself
unable to exercise much, if any, self-restraint.
There is no new "bright line" in Lopez to separate
federal and state power, other than the straightforward
reminder that federal power is not without limit. There
is also the related admonition that when Congress
regulates under its commerce authority in the future,
the regulation had better have some genuine
connection to "economic activity." However pernicious
the possession of a gun in school is, it is not that.
Therefore, it is now up to the state and local
governments to address this anti-social behavior, and
remedy it in light of their particular local conditions,
with school suspension, fine, imprisonment or some
other unique course of action of their own devising.
This is, as I say, not mathematically precise. The
court admits as much and, given the dynamic nature of
constitutional decisionmaking and the modem
difficulties we face, it could not be. But precise or not,
it does point, as the court suggests, "to a correct
decision" denying the unthinkingly deferential
expansion of national power.
Professor Kmiec teaches Constitutional Law at the
University ofNotre Dame.
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In Pennsylvania they're angry about the Clean Air
Act. During debate last fall to suspend his state's auto
emissions program, Representative Fred Trello fumed,
"This is one member who doesn't take threats very
lightly. I think we should tell the federal government to
take their mandates and shove them."
They're upset in Idaho about federal landfill
regulations. "We're going to say to the feds that from
now on, we'll be in charge of what happens to the state
of Idaho," proclaimed Representative JoAn Wood.
In New Mexico, ranchers threaten violence and
county attorneys file lawsuits to stop federal rangeland
reforms. Legislators in at least five western states have
called for their states to assert sovereignty over federal
land.
Colorado Representative Bill Jerke has introduced
legislation to keep the federal government from
reintroducing wolves and other long-gone species into
his state.
Legislators and governors in Florida, Arizona and
California are fed up with the federal government's
immigration decisions. Testifying before the U.S.
Senate Appropriations Committee last summer,
Florida Governor Lawton Chiles asserted, "Illegal
immigration has created a living nightmare for
Floridians. I ask you to relieve Florida of the unfair
burden that illegal immigration has become."
Arizona Governor Fife Symington added: "We are
really in desperate shape. We are virtually under
siege."
Expressing this anger is the language of rebellion
and revolution. Appearing on the MacNeil/Lehrer
News Hour in January, Virginia Governor George
Allen called the November elections a rebellion. "And
that rebellion was led by people all across the country
who felt the federal government has become overly
centralized. It became overly burdensome, out of
touch, too big and out of reach of the people."
New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman
called it "a revolution of ideas," on This Week with
David Brinkley
Conservative economist Walter Williams wrote in
a January column that federal politicians "have
seriously underestimated public anger and are blind to
the rebellion spreading across the land."
Anger about wolves, clean air and immigrants.
The rhetoric of rebellion and revolution. What's going
on here? It's a call for state sovereignty, a call to
restore the 10th Amendment. It's constitutional and
it's practical, too. Which level of government should
make what decisions? What's the appropriate balance,
and what are the consequences?
A host of state legislators and governors strongly
believe that the federal government has overreached
the authority originally intended by the Founding
Fathers. Michigan Governor John Engler, former
majority leader of his state Senate, captures the
argument this way: "We are not the colonies. And
Washington isn't king." New York Senator James
Lack laments, "If James Madison were alive today and
tuned into C-Span from his Virginia homestead, he
would probably lapse into catatonic shock when he
saw what had become of our Union." Writing for the
majority in New York vs. United States, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, a former Arizona legislative leader,
argued that "[Congress] may not conscript state
governments as its agent." Engler and Lack no doubt
would assert that in many instances state governments,
in fact, have been commandeered as administrative
arms of the federal government.
10TH AMENDMENT AS FOCUS
State lawmakers are up in arms over the
emasculation of the 10th Amendment's promise that:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."
A combination of activist congresses and
presidents and a series of adverse judicial rulings
through the early 1990s rendered the 10th Amendment
virtually impotent. Its nadir came in the 1987 case,
South Carolina vs. Baker, in which the Court told
states they should seek solutions to their problems
through the political process -- an alternative that had
the effect, according to a Wall Street Journal editorial
at the time, of providing states with no better standing
than mustard makers and other private interests.
Although Congress' insatiable appetite for
imposing a federal solution for every problem did not
abate, growing annual deficits and process agreements
such as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings reduced the amount
of federal money available. Frequently the national
government created new programs or expanded old
ones by telling the states they were responsible for
finding the money to pay for them.
Grant conditions and sanctions -- for example,
withholding highway funds to force seat belt laws and
the 55-mile-per-hour speed limit - were other favored
devices. At the same time, the federal government
made successful incursions on state revenue bases --
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for example, eliminating the deductibility of state and
local sales taxes.
Without the protection of the 10th Amendment,
state governments were relatively helpless to resist
these federal instructions and limitations of authority.
No wonder state officials are angry.
But how to channel the anger? How to redress the
balance, restore state sovereignty and revitalize the
10th Amendment?
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
State leaders do not necessarily agree on a
solution. In fact, there are at least a dozen more or less
prominent proposals for restoring the balance. They fit
roughly into four categories: A Conference of the
States, constitutional amendments, state legislative
actions and legal challenges. Although they may differ
in approach, they share a common objective: restoring
state sovereignty and standing in the federal system.
CONFERENCE OF THE STATES
Utah Governor Mike Leavitt says that he first
drafted the Conference of the States concept paper
while in the Rocky Mountains over the 1993
Thanksgiving weekend.
Since then, he's crisscrossed the country--meeting
with legislators, governors, members of Congress and
reporters, explaining the proposal, drumming up
support, and setting the conference in motion.
Although some of the specifics have changed in a
year and a half, Leavitt's primary goal remains
inviolate--provide a "nonbinding, yet formal, process
for states to develop a plan to restore balance to the
federal system."
Legislatures currently are considering "resolutions
of participation" in the Conference of the States. If 26
states approve convening a conference, plans call for
a preliminary bipartisan meeting of representatives
appointed by legislative leaders from participating
states. That meeting will be devoted to organizing and
to drafting an agenda for the conference.
As now planned, the Conference of the States
would follow on Oct. 22-25 in Philadelphia's
Constitutional Hall with each state sending a
delegation of its governor and a bipartisan mix of six
legislators from both chambers.
Delegations would discuss and vote on solutions
for restoring the balance of power between states and
the federal government. Organizers have emphasized
that the conference will not consider single issues,
especially such volatile ones as gun control, abortion
or immigration.
Recommendations from the conference will be
drafted into a "States' Petition," which will be carried
by delegates to their legislatures. Once approved by
three-fourths of the state legislatures, the petition will
be sent to Congress.
So far, debate in some legislatures on the
Conference of the States has proved contentious.
Conservative state Senator Charles Duke led the
opposition in Colorado by arguing that the conference
will turn itself into a true constitutional convention.
"This is really serious business," he said. "My
concern is that this will absolutely be a steamroller. Do
we have reason to fear what they might do to our
Constitution? I suggest we do."
Colorado legislative supporters, including Senate
Majority Leader Jeff Wells and House Majority Leader
Tim Foster, said the conference would provide a forum
for the 50 states to "come up with a unified voice to
Congress."
"Rather than whining one at a time, we could
speak to Congress this way (through the conference),"
Foster said.
Organizations backing the Conference of the
States, which include the Council of State
Governments (CSG), the National Governors
Association and the National Conference of State
Legislatures, contend it could not mutate into a
constitutional convention.
The Conference of the States does not follow the
necessary procedures nor does it meet the
constitutional requirements necessary to amend the
U.S. Constitution, according to CSG.
States have the power to convene a constitutional
convention, but that has never been done for fear of a
"runaway" convention that could do more harm than
good to the Constitution.
To correct perceived imbalances between state and
federal roles, Governor Leavitt says, the states have
two choices: "make speeches," which is ineffective, or
call a constitutional convention, which is impossible.
"We need a middle ground, and the Conference of the
States is that middle ground," he says.
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Approaches with a constitutional focus include
linking unfunded mandate protection to the balanced
budget amendment, changes in the way the
Constitution can be amended and attempts to alter or
to force enforcement of the 10th Amendment.
The elections last November gave Congress
impetus to propose at least one constitutional
amendment - a requirement to balance the federal
budget.
Several legislative leaders are concerned about the
effect that amendment could have on state budgets and
policy priorities.
Being careful not to argue against balancing the
federal budget, these Republican and Democratic
leaders reason that a constitutional provision would
substantially increase pressures on the federal
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government to mandate more programs, raid state
revenue sources and shift costs to the states.
"The concern," said Colorado Senate President
Tom Norton, "is that state and local policy and funding
priorities will be shoved off the table in favor of
federal programs.
Several former state legislators now serving in
Congress - New Jersey Congressman Bob Franks,
Ohio Congressman Paul Gillmor and Missouri
Congresswoman Karen McCarthy, among others --
tried unsuccessfully to amend the balanced budget
amendment when it was on the floor of the U.S.
House. Their amendment would have limited unfunded
mandates, grant conditions and other cost shifts to
state governments.
Now, some legislative leaders -- including those
like Norton who believe strongly in the need for the
balanced budget amendment -- are suggesting that
legislatures delay ratification of the balanced budget
amendment until Congress sends them an amendment
that would protect states against federal cost shifts.
Discussing this option at a leaders' meeting in January
legislators noted the difficulty of resisting the intense
pressure from the public and some governors to rapidly
ratify the measure. Senator Norton, though, believes
that legislatures have too much at stake not to try. "It
would be the supreme irony if the elimination of state
sovereignty became an unintended consequence of the
national drive to restore fiscal responsibility to the
federal government."
Some legislators are attracted to two other
constitutional amendment proposals, both intended to
afford states more clout. One would amend Article V,
which currently specifies two methods for amending
the Constitution -- one that requires states to wait for
Congress to propose an amendment and the other,
unused for more than 200 years, that lets two-thirds of
the legislatures call a constitutional convention. The
other would strengthen the 10th Amendment.
An NCSL [National Conference of State
Legislatures] Task Force on Federalism, chaired by
Ohio Senate President Stan Aronoff, worked on both
alternatives during 1987 and 1988. The task force
considered several proposals that would allow
legislatures to initiate constitutional amendments
without resorting to a constitutional convention. One,
for example, would allow three-fourths of the
legislatures to offer an amendment to the Constitution
that would take effect after two years unless two-thirds
of the Congress disapproved it.
The task force's 10th Amendment solution, a
reaction to Supreme Court decisions that virtually
ignore the amendment, would force the Court to be
arbiter in disputes between Congress and the states.
The task force suggested the following addition to the
10th Amendment: "Whether a power is one reserved to
the states, or to the people, shall be a matter to be
decided by the Court."
Tennessee Senator Douglas Henry and
then-Illinois Senator Dawn Netsch called this the "and
we really mean it" amendment, arguing it would have
the effect of reinserting the 10th Amendment into the
Constitution.
Despite a flurry of activity in support of the
proposals, they failed to elicit strong interest in
Congress. Either could now surface as a solution to be
considered by the Conference of the States.
LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS
Some legislatures have attempted to restore
balance through their own actions -- through statutes,
resolutions to Congress and changes to their
procedures.
Last year, the Colorado legislature adopted a bill,
co-sponsored by Norton and House Speaker Chuck
Berry, that takes a three-pronged approach to unfunded
mandates. It authorizes a comprehensive study of
federal mandates, requires state officials to identify
federal mandates that are inconsistent with state policy
and creates a mechanism for reviewing federal
mandates through the annual budget process.
New Missouri legislation creates a position for an
auditor who is charged with monitoring federal
mandates. The Arizona Legislature has created House
and Senate committees with jurisdiction over federal
mandates and states' rights issues. Legislators in
Colorado and Oklahoma have introduced resolutions
to earmark or freeze federal taxes in state bank
accounts as a reserve to use against unfunded
mandates.
Legislatures in several states, including Colorado,
Hawaii and Missouri, have adopted resolutions
declaring state sovereignty under the 10th Amendment
and instructing the federal government to cease and
desist mandates that "are beyond the scope of
constitutionally designated powers."
LEGAL CHALLENGES
A third general approach for restoring balance
involves filing suits against the federal government.
Arizona, for example, has created a Constitutional
Defense Council, composed of the governor, attorney
general, Senate president and speaker. The council,
established last fall, mounts court challenges to
objectionable federal laws and regulations.
Several states have sued the federal government to
avoid complying with federal legislation or
regulations. Recent examples include immigration
(California, Florida and Texas), clean air (Missouri
and Utah), motor voter (South Carolina and
California), intrastate trucking deregulation (Oklahoma
and Michigan) and the Brady Bill (Montana). Often,
these suits assert that the federal government has
exceeded the limits established by the 10th
Amendment. Often, courts assert otherwise.
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Other states have chosen to engage in a form of
intergovernmental civil disobedience, refusing to
comply with federal requirements. Legislatures in
Illinois and Pennsylvania, for example, have failed to
implement provisions of the federal motor voter law
(National Voter Registration Act). California Gov.
Pete Wilson was challenged by ABC news reporter
Sam Donaldson for his veto of motor voter legislation:
"How can you get away with not obeying it?" asked
Donaldson.
"Well, I think what you do is you challenge
something that you believe in good faith to be
unconstitutional," said Wilson.
Donaldson:' "But you're not obeying it, are you?"
Wilson: "No, because in fact I think it is flatly
unconstitutional."
CAN THEY SUCCEED?
What are the chances that any of these approaches
will succeed? The movement to restore balance has
several factors that could contribute to success. There
is the leadership of state officials such as Governor
Leavitt and Senator Norton and many others who are
committed to effecting change. There is the new
Republican congressional majority that wants to trim
the federal government and to return responsibilities to
the states.
To succeed, though, leaders of the movement will
have to overcome three notions deeply embedded in the
public mind. One equates states' rights with opposition
to civil rights. Illinois Congresswoman Cardiss
Collins summarized this feeling in floor debate on the
unfunded mandates bill earlier this year. The mandates
bill, she claimed, was about "destroying laws that
protect the average citizen. It is about raising barriers
and debilitating the disenfranchised."
The second notion, imbued in the editorial policy
of The New York Times and other national media
giants, is that the states are not capable of handling the
responsibility of governing. For example, under the
headline, "So0 You Think You Want a Devolution," R.
W. Apple Jr. alleged in a January New York Times
story that "the federal government, for all its failings,
attracts far more talented people than most state
governments." New York Times columnist Russell
Baker continued the blanket character assassination a
few days later with: "The quality of state government
varies crazily. State legislators in many [states] are for
sale cheap. ... Giving federal power over big money
matters back tot he states seems likely to raise the
prices state legislators want for their votes."
The third notion is that states are archaic. The
Times' R.W. Apple endorsed this argument in the
same January article. "In the early days of the nation,
states made some kind of geopolitical sense. Virginia
was different from Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvania
was different from Rhode Island . .. (B)y and large,
each state did represent a kind of community, with
shared interests and values. That is much less true
today. Brooklyn and rural western New York share
little beyond the government, a currency and (up to a
point) a language."
Senator Lack rebuts these notions. "The New
York Times and others have missed or ignored the past
30 years in the history of state governments. The fact
of the matter is that legislatures are responsible. They
have modernized and are entirely capable of
governing."
To Lack, it boils down to trust. "The question on
everyone's lips is: Can the states be trusted? But as
James Madison well knew, the question was once: Can
the federal government be trusted? His answer, and
ours, is that both levels deserve trust and respect."
The movement to restore the balance may succeed
in any event. It could succeed because so many state
officials are angry and believe there is a chance--that
may not come again--to do it now.
"If we blow it," says Arizona Senate Majority
Leader Tom Patterson, "there aren't going to be many
more chances. I think we have a chance to restore a
true democratic and republican government and the
federal system that was envisioned by our founders it's
a tremendous responsibility."
Carl Tubbesing is director of the Washington
office of the National Conference of State
Legislators.
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POWER OF STATES MAY GET BIG BOOST FROM HIGH COURT
The Seattle Times, Sunday, June 4, 1995
Timothy M. Phelps
Newsday
Washington - In 1857, the Supreme Court ruled in
its infamous Dred Scott decision that Congress had
no power to ban slavery in the territories.
After the bloody Civil War that ensued, the court
proceeded on similar grounds to gut the civil-rights
laws passed to protect freed slaves.
But the issue went beyond race. The court went
on to rule that nothing in the Constitution explicitly
gave Congress the right to pass child-labor laws, and
it struck down many other economic regulations.
Two recent decisions have revealed the existence
of a revolutionary states' rights movement within the
court that is disposed to return to the days of limited
federal government.
In May the court, over bitter dissent from four
justices, said the federal government had no authority
in the Constitution to ban guns in local schools.
Almost more worrisome to those who fear an
eclipse of federal power was Justice Clarence
Thomas' recent dissent, joined by three others, from
a decision holding state congressional term limits
unconstitutional.
That dissent asserted that other than those few
powers explicitly enumerated in the Constitution,
government authority rests with the states and the
people who live in them.
Since the Constitution does not mention term
limits, Thomas wrote, the right to set them is left in
the hands of the states.
Other than defense, the powers given to
Congress under the Constitution are: to coin money;
punish piracy; establish copyrights; build post
offices and roads; punish counterfeiters; regulate
commerce; collect taxes and borrow money; provide
for the general welfare; and oversee naturalization
and bankruptcy proceedings.
REST IS UP TO STATES
And that's all. Everything else would be up to
each individual state.
Under Thomas' views of the Constitution as set
out in these two cases, there probably could be no
federal welfare for the poor or Medicare for the
elderly, no national farm or school programs, and no
governmental regulation of industry.
In the school-guns case, no other justice signed
onto Thomas' concurrence, which explicitly
suggested that it might be proper to return to the law
enforced a century ago. But four other justices -
William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Anthony
Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Connor - were willing to
go at least part way.
But the dissent in term limits, signed by all the
above except Kennedy, indicated that the court is but
one vote away from radical change.
Harry Scheiber, a law professor at the University
of California at Berkeley, and one of the nation's top
experts on federalism, called Thomas' term-limits
dissent "irresponsible" and said its historical analysis
was "weird and almost incoherent."
"It's a very radical agenda under the guise of
conservatism," he said.
Scheiber said the implications for the future are
"ominous." If for example, the court's oldest member,
John Paul Stevens, 75, is replaced by a conservative
during the next presidential term, there could be a
majority for Thomas' side.
Roger Pilon of the libertarian Cato Institute in
Washington was as pleased by the new developments
as Scheiber was concerned.
"It means we may be coming out of the era of
laws for technicians and into the era of law in all its
majesty," said Pilon, one of the conservative legal
movement's intellectual forces.
Pilon, like Thomas, is unabashed in suggesting
a return to concepts that have been considered
discredited and outlandish since 1937.
In the early 1930s, the court had invalidated
most of President Roosevelt's program to pull the
nation out of the Depression.
It was only when Roosevelt proposed packing
the court with up to six additional justices that the
existing justices changed their minds.
In the years following, the court stood aside as
Roosevelt virtually created the huge federal
bureaucracy that exists today.
The court, as its members were replaced with
Roosevelt's New Dealers, approved wholesale
federal regulation of the economy under the broadest
interpretation of Congress' enumerated right to
regulate interstate commerce.
LIMIT ON GROWING WHEAT
The court even went so far as to rule in 1942
that the federal government could impose a limit on
the amount of wheat an Ohio farmer could grow,
even though he grew his own seed, and he and his
chickens consumed all his grain.
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The fhrmer's planting had an effect on interstate
commerce because if he had not grown the wheat, he
would have bought it on the open market, the court
reasoned.
Pilon said with the Republican majority in
Congress, the court's conservatives might feel that
there is crucial support there for returning to the
doctrines in place before the New Deal. And he said
Thomas seems to be having success in driving at
least Scalia and the previously more cautious
Rehnquist in that direction. O'Connor, normally not
in accord with the court's more ideological
conservatives, is nevertheless an ardent proponent of
states' rights.
What seems to be happening, Pilon said, is that
these judges are finally shedding their fear ofjudicial
activism. Though judicial restraint was the mantra of
conservatives during the liberal 1960s, "the problem
now isn't judicial activism; it's judicial restraint," he
said.
Not everyone agrees that there is a judicial
revolution in the making.
Daniel Lowenstein, who teaches constitutional
law at UCLA, said it is far too late to seriously alter
the nation's powerful federal government.
"The court could rule that gravity is
unconstitutional or that teenagers can't take drugs,
but that doesn't mean it's going to happen," he said.
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94-1947 LOVE v. PEPERSACK
Second Amendment-Denial of application to
purchase handgun-42 USC 1983.
Ruling below (CA 4, 47 F.3d 120):
Second Amendment does not apply to states
and, even as against federal regulation, does not
confer absolute individual right to bear any type
of firearm, but instead confers only collective
right of keeping and bearing arms that must bear
reasonable relationship to preservation or effi-
ciency of well-regulated militia; individual whose
gun purchase application was erroneously reject-
ed by county police did not show how her posses-
sion of handgun will preserve or insure effective-
ness of militia, and thus did not establish
violation of Second Amendment; police officers'
rejection of application on basis of applicant's
prior arrest record with unknown dispositions was
corner-cutting forced by time constraints, and
thus cannot be characterized as unjustified by
circumstances or governmental interest or as in-
capable of rectification via post-deprivation state
remedies (given that it was in fact so rectified);
accordingly, erroneous denial of application did
not give rise to cause of action under 42 USC
1983 for violation of substantive due process.
Questions presented: (1) Does Second Amend-
ment guarantee individual right to keep and bear
arms, or collective right of states to maintain
militias? (2) Must person have some affiliation
with organized state militia in order to have
standing to assert Second Amendment claim as
part of action brought pursuant to 42 USC 1983?
(3) Is Second Amendment applicable to states via
Due Process Clause? (4) Did petitioner's com-
plaint state cause of action under 42 USC 1983
when it is alleged, inter alia, that in disapproving
her application to purchase firearm respondents
knew that they had no lawful basis for their
conduct, and that they acted willfully and mali-
ciously and with reckless disregard of petitioner's
constitutional rights?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/30/95, by How-
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OPINION
K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge:
April Love appeals the dismissal of her 42 U.S.C.
§1983 civil rights suit against various Maryland state
troopers. We affirm.
According to her complaint, in September, 1990,
April Love tried to purchase a handgun at a shop in
Prince George's County, Maryland. She filled out an
application required by state law. All of her answers to
the questions posed were true and correct.
The licensing division of the Maryland state police
received the application on September 18, 1990. It
was strapped for time--Maryland law gives the police
only seven days to deny the application; if it does not
act, the dealer may legally sell the firearm. On
September 21, Corporal Ernest Pletcher reviewed the
application and a computer printout from Maryland
police and Federal Bureau of Investigation files. He
discovered that Ms. Love had been arrested on four
occasions. In 1976, while working as a stripper, Ms.
Love had been arrested twice for participating in an
obscene show and once for indecent exposure. In
1978, she had been arrested and charged with two
counts of battery and one of resisting arrest. She was
convicted of only one of these crimes-a
misdemeanor-though disposition of the charges was
not apparent on the computer printout.
Without further investigation, Pletcher
recommended that the application be denied. Sergeant
Robert Pepersack reviewed the file and made the final
decision to deny the application. A letter to Ms. Love
reporting the denial was signed by Lieutenant Merrill
Messick. In separate correspondence, Messick
instructed the dealer not to sell Ms. Love the handgun.
The reason for the denial was the prior arrest
record itself, and both Pletcher and Pepersack later
testified that it was standard practice to deny
applications on that basis. The Maryland Code lists
several grounds for denying an application, but a prior
arrest is not such a ground.
Love exhausted state administrative remedies
without success, and then sued in state court. She won.
The court ordered the state police to approve her
application. Love then filed this § 1983 suit--alleging
violations of substantive due process, a "right to
contract," and the Second Amendment-- against
Pletcher, Pepersack, Messick, and the state police
commander, Colonel Elmer Tippett. The defendants




We divide due process into "substantive" and
"procedural" prongs, though the latter term is
redundant and the first is, strictly speaking, a conflict
in terms. Love asserts only a substantive due process
claim. Substantive due process is a far narrower
concept than procedural; it is an absolute check on
certain governmental actions notwithstanding "the
fairness of the procedures used to implement them."
To win her case, Love must first have a property
right in the approval of her application to purchase a
handgun. Property rights can be created and defined by
state laws, but laws calling for issuance of a license or
permit cannot create property rights unless "the [state
actor] lacks all discretion to deny issuance of the
permit or to withhold its approval. Any significant
discretion conferred upon the local agency defeats the
claim of a property interest."
Whether Love has a property interest under
Gardner is a close call, as is whether Gardner ought to
even apply outside the context of land use. The state
permitting statute requires the applicant to deny all
potentially disqualifying circumstances in the
application itself. The police have the power to deny
the application only if it is incomplete or any
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information on it is false. It is a stretch to deem that
power "discretionary." Nonetheless, because we decide
below that Love's claim fails the second prong of the
substantive due process test, we will assume without
deciding that Gardner does govern here and that Love
has a property interest in approval of her application.
A violation of "substantive" due process occurs
only where the government's actions in depriving a
person of life, liberty, or property are so unjust that no
amount of fair procedure can rectify them. [T]he
residual protections of "substantive due process" in
this (or any) context run only to state action so
arbitrary or irrational, so unjustified by any
circumstance or governmental interest, as to be literally
incapable of avoidance by any pre-deprivation
procedural protections or of adequate rectification by
any post-deprivation state remedies. Irrationality and
arbitrariness imply a most stringent standard against
which state action is to be measured in assessing a
substantive due process claim.
Here we agree with the district court that Love's
claim fails. Though their acts apparently violated state
law, these police officers were forced by the extreme
time constraints to streamline investigations. They
erred on the side of caution by denying applications
where a computer check showed arrests with unknown
dispositions. We cannot say that this corner-cutting
was "unjustified by circumstance or governmental
interest" or that its effect was "literally incapable of
... adequate rectification by any post-deprivation state
remedies." Indeed, the deprivation here was fully
rectified. State courts exist in order to, among other
things, protect citizens against misapplications of state
law. We would trivialize the Due Process Clause to
invoke it every time the citizen defeats the state in state
court. The Clause is violated only where the state
courts can do nothing to rectify the injury that the state
has already arbitrarily inflicted.
III.
Citing law review articles, Love argues that she
has an individual federal constitutional right to "keep
and bear" a handgun, and Maryland may not infringe
upon this right.
She is wrong on both counts. The Second
Amendment does not apply to the states. Moreover,
even as against federal regulation, the amendment does
not confer an absolute individual right to bear any type
of firearm. In 1939, the Supreme Court held that the
federal statute prohibiting possession of a sawed-off
shotgun was constitutional, because the defendant had
not shown that his possession of such a gun bore a
Hreasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia." Since then, the
lower federal courts have uniformly held that the
Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather than
individual, right. This court's precedent is United
States v. Johnson. In Johnson, the defendant
challenged the constitutionality of the federal statute
prohibiting possession of firearms by convicted felons.
We were not impressed.
Johnson's argument that [18 U.S.C. §] 922(g) is
an unconstitutional violation of his Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms is not new.
The courts have consistently held that the Second
Amendment only confers a collective right of keeping
and bearing arms which must bear a "reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well-regulated militia." Johnson presents no evidence
that section 922 (g) in any way affects the maintenance
of a well regulated militia. Love has likewise not
identified how her possession of a handgun will
preserve or insure the effectiveness of the militia.
The judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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Washington - It's in the Bill of Rights and at the heart
of America's anguish over guns, but law professors
ignore it, legal casebooks omit it, and Supreme Courtjustices dodge it.
For decades, the American Bar Association, the
American Civil Liberties Union, gun-control
advocates, federal judges and most scholars have
regarded the one-sentence, badly written Second
Amendment as a constitutional relic. It provides no
individual right to bear arms, but merely protects state
militias -- today's National Guard - from being
disarmed by the national government, they say.
But to the National Rifle Association, its millions
of members, and government-hating extremists armed
with weapons and conspiracy theories, the Second
Amendment is as revered as biblical text. It
guarantees, they insist, that a citizen may possess a
gun to defend against crime or tyranny, although the
NRA avoids making the argument in court.
Surprisingly in recent years, the NRA's view has
gained scholarly attention -- and some respectability.
No less a legal figure than Professor William Van
Alstyne of Duke University, a respected scholar who
confesses his own neglect of the Second Amendment
during 30 years of teaching constitutional law,
concludes that the NRA's basic claim is "extremely
strong" and ought not to be dismissed lightly.
Drawing on English history and the writings of
James Madison and early constitutional analysts, Van
Alstyne concludes that the Second Amendment
developed out of a fear of a national standing army. It
was intended, he said, to protect the right of ordinary
citizens who made up the state militias.
Even so, no individual right is absolute. Van
Alstyne, a former Air Force sharpshooter who owns a
semiautomatic rifle, warned that the Second
Amendment "doesn't mean there can't be any
regulation of firearms or that you can own a howitzer
or carry a gun into a courtroom or a classroom."
And, alluding to the Michigan Militia and its
counterparts in other states, he added: "It doesn't mean
private armies can be organized under the protection of
the Second Amendment."
Last month, 26 professors of law and public
policy told the House subcommittee on crime that the
Second Amendment is being trivialized by gun control
advocates and others as little more than a protection
for target shooters, recreational hunters or state
militias.
Rather, they declared, the amendment was meant
to make citizens equal partners with government in
ensuring individual and community safety. Citizens
living in increasingly dangerous inner cities cannot be
disarmed and left "to the mercy of well-armed
criminals," they said.
Even though the notion of government tyranny in
the United States seems remote, they cited the murders
of millions of unarmed people by their own
governments in Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia,
Mao's China and Pol Pot's Cambodia as reason enough
to question any "state monopolies of force."
Most Americans believe they have a right to
firearms. In a June 1994 Gallup Poll, 55 percent of
them said they wouldn't give up that right in an effort
to reduce crime.
President Clinton, a former teacher of
constitutional law himself, said in the aftermath of the
Oklahoma City bombing last month that people do
"have a right to keep and bear arms," but only for
lawful purposes.
Yet federal judges have uniformly rejected the
notion that Americans are constitutionally entitled to
own a gun and, while the Supreme Court hasn't
addressed the issue in 56 years, two retired justices
reject the NRA's view.
The Second Amendment never was intended to
"guarantee every person the constitutional right to have
a 'Saturday night special' or a machine gun without any
regulation whatsoever," former Chief Justice Warren
E. Burger declared in a 1991 interview. He called the
NRA's view "a fraud on the American public."
Remarked former Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. in a
1988 speech: "It is not easy to understand why the
Second Amendment ... should be viewed as creating a
right to own and carry a weapon [the handgun] that
contributes so directly to the shocking number of
murders in our society."
LITTLE TRAVELED LEGAL TERRITORY:
Despite its advanced age, the Second Amendment
remains in its infancy as a legal concept, Duke's Van
Alstyne said.
It is, he said, constitutional territory as
undeveloped as the First Amendment was in the early
20th century, before Supreme Court Justices Oliver
Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis began forcefully
exploring the importance of freedom of speech and
press.
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In fact, Van Alstyne likens the NRA's role in
advancing a Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms to the ACLU's leadership in championing the
First Amendment's protection of free expression in the
1920s.
The numerous issues raised by the Second
Amendment -- including the exact meaning of its text
and whether it applies to the states -- "simply haven't
been heard" by the Supreme Court, he said.
The fundamental legal question about the Second
Amendment is whether it confers an individual or a
collective right.
Is the "right of the people to keep and bear arms"
a personal right of each citizen -- or is it merely a right
reserved to people in the "well-regulated" National
Guard?
Court rulings overwhelmingly support the latter
view.
AMENDMENT RARELY USED:
In its only 20th century ruling on the meaning of
the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court upheld
federal regulation of sawed-off shotguns on grounds
that such firearms have no "reasonable relationship to
the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated
militia."
The eight-page ruling, issued in 1939 in the case
of U.S. vs. Miller, found no evidence "that this weapon
is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that
its use could contribute to the common defense."
But Van Alstyne said that test would protect
possession of other weapons that are useful to militias,
such as heavy-duty automatic rifles.
After the town of Morton Grove, Ill., banned
handguns, a Chicago-based federal appeals court
rejected a challenge, ruling that the Second
Amendment gave Americans no right to possess
handguns. The Supreme Court, without explanation,
left the ban intact in 1983 by refusing to review it.
Similar Second Amendment claims continue to
fail in the federal courts -- as former stripper April
Love learned this year. Love argued that the police had
blocked her request to buy a handgun in Maryland, in
violation of her right to keep and bear arms.
A federal appeals court panel ruled against her for
three reasons. First, the Second Amendment doesn't
restrict the states. Second, Love's use of a handgun is
unrelated to the preservation of a state militia.
And third, ever since the Miller decision, "the
lower federal courts have uniformly held that the
Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather than
an individual, right," the panel observed.
Small wonder, then, that "the gun industry has
consistently chosen not to raise Second Amendment
claims in court," said Edward E. Kallgren, a San
Francisco lawyer who heads the American Bar
Association's coordinating committee on gun violence.
"As lawyers, we know why," he told the House
subcommittee on crime last month. "They cannot point
to a single legitimate precedent to support their
claims."
CHALLENGES TO GUN CONTROL:
In fact, the NRA hasn't raised the Second
Amendment in its most recent challenges to the federal
ban on assault weapons and the Brady law, which
requires a five-day waiting period for gun purchases
while officials check the buyer's background.
"When it comes to vindicating this supposedly
fundamental right, the NRA is all talk and no action,"
said Dennis Henigan, general counsel for Handgun
Control Inc.
"Why? Because the NRA knows that every time
the arguments about the history and meaning of the
Second Amendment are put before a court of law, its
version of an absolute, inalienable right to keep and
bear arms is shown to be nothing but an illusion,"
Henigan said.
When federal judges in Arizona, Mississippi,
Montana and Vermont blocked the Brady law, they
cited the Tenth Amendment, not the Second. The Tenth
Amendment reserves to the states those powers that are
not explicitly delegated to the federal government.
And the Supreme Court recently opened a new
avenue of attack on federal gun control laws by ruling
that Congress exceeded its commerce powers by
banning possession of guns near schools.
Other federal gun control measures now may be
challenged as violations of Congress' authority over
interstate commerce.
States and localities, meanwhile, are enacting gun
control measures of their own.
About half the states have constitutional
provisions that guarantee individuals the right to bear
arms for self-defense.
But state courts have ruled that those guarantees
are subject to reasonable state regulation.
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.
U.S. Constitution, Amendment II.
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A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS?
Courts Don't Buy Gun Owners' Claims
Rocky Mountain News
Sunday, June 4, 1995
Robert Hardaway
The Second Amendment refers to the carrying of
arms in the context of a "well-regulated militia." While
some gun owners love to wave the Constitution to
support their "right to bear arms," the fact is that the
Constitution clearly gives the Supreme Court (and not
gun owners) the power to interpret and apply the it.
And in U.S. vs. Miller, the Supreme Court
extensively reviewed the constitutional history and
original intent of the Second Amendment, and
concluded in no uncertain terms that since the carrying
of a weapon must have "some reasonable relationship
to the preservation and efficiency of a well-regulated
militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an
instrument."
In Stevens vs. U.S., another federal court stated
even more directly that "the Second Amendment right
to keep and bear arms applies only to the right of the
state to maintain a militia and not to the individual's
right to bear arms."
Even if the Second Amendment could somehow be
amended to include an individual right to bear arms,
however, it would not apply to states or local
governments. In Presser vs. Illinois the Supreme Court
specifically declined to apply the Second Amendment
to the states via the 14th Amendment's Due Process
and Equal Protection Clause (which was clearly passed
to protect the civil rights of African-Americans).
According to Interpol, in 1990, the U.S. had more
than 35 times the number of handgun homicides per
100,000 people than countries that restricted gun
ownership. For example, Great Britain had seven
handgun homicides, Canada eight, and the U.S. 8,915.
It is surely not a coincidence that in Great Britain there
are only 837 handguns per 100,000 people, while in
the U.S. there are over 22,000 handguns per 100,000
people.
In fact, the correlation between handgun
ownership and handgun deaths is very high. In 1993,
guns of all kinds killed 70,000 Americans (more than
all Americans killed in the Vietnam War).
Nor do "cultural differences" account for the
differences in handgun homicides between the U.S.
and other countries with strict gun laws. A study of
two cities with highly similar populations and cultures
(Seattle and Vancouver) revealed that the risk of being
murdered by a handgun in Seattle was 4.8 times the
risk in Vancouver. The main difference is that Canada
has stringent gun laws, while Washington does not.
Although self-defense is often cited as the reason
for gun ownership, Kellerman and Reay's study of the
use of guns for self-defense revealed that there were
"53 suicides, criminal homicides or accidental deaths
involving a gun kept at home for every case of
homicide for 'self-protection."' Studies also reveal that
a commercial enterprise proprietor or homeowner is
much more likely to suffer severe injury if he resists a
robbery with a gun than if he does not.
Even the slogan "Guns don't kill people; people
kill people" has been abandoned by many gun
enthusiasts. (One recent bumper sticker updated the
slogan: "Guns don't kill people; children kill people.")
Under this theory, of course, every citizen should have
the right to carry a suitcase nuclear weapon, since
"Nuclear weapons don't kill people; people kill
people."
Another rationale for justifying the annual
handgun slaughter under the banner of the "right to
bear arms" is that armed militias are necessary to resist
government "tyranny." In Nazi Germany, the
ownership of a gun by a private individual only gave
the government another excuse to arrest and seize. The
arming of half the male citizenry for military purposes
did little to prevent dictatorship in Germany.
By contrast, democracies such as Great Britain
and Canada have suffered no threats to their liberties
as a result of gun restrictions. Indeed, the biggest
threat to our freedoms now lies in the measures the
government might be forced to take to protect citizens
from the anarchy and slaughter caused by unrestricted
handgun use.
While any changes in the gun laws should protect
the interests of legitimate uses of guns, if the
Constitution is to be amended to provide for an
"individual" right to bear arms, it should be amended
in the only way sanctioned by the Constitution: the
passing of a constitutional amendment.





The San Diego Union-Tribune
Sunday, June 25, 1995
Michael J. Kumeta
There continues to be heated discussion over
gun-control measures, with much of the public
discourse supporting restrictions on public ownership.
To balance this continuing discussion, open minds
should re-examine the gun-control debate both in light
of the Second Amendment's right to keep and bear
arms and in terms of enlightened public policy. The
Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides:
"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." Gun-control
proponents cite the word "Militia" in an attempt to
prove that the Second Amendment encompasses a
collective right of the states rather than an individual
right of the people. Scholarly articles analyzing our
nation's constitutional history proves otherwise,
however. Don B. Kates, Jr., a nationally renowned
Second Amendment scholar, conducted a survey of all
law review articles published since 1980 addressing
this issue. Of 41 articles, 37 accept the "individuals'
right" view while four support the "states' right"
position. The variance in the quality of these works is
illustrative of the debate.
Of the four "states' right" articles, lawyers of
Handgun Control Inc. wrote two; a lobbyist for the
National Coalition to Ban Handguns wrote one; and an
anti-gun politician wrote the other.
By contrast, authors accepting the "individual's
right" view included renowned liberal constitutional
theorists who do not own guns, do not support the gun
lobby and neither expected not desired the conclusions
forced upon them by the facts.
While it is true that liberal, activist judges on
several federal appellate courts have ruled otherwise
(in clear disregard of constitutional history), the U.S.
Supreme Court has never definitively ruled on the
issue. The only case to touch upon the issue, United
States vs. Miller (1939), is ambiguous at best. To this
day, however, the United States Code distinguishes
between the organized militia (the National Guard)
and the "unorganized militia" (all able-bodied males
between the ages of 17 and 45). A second myth
perpetuated by gun-control advocates is that the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that the Second Amendment
is inapplicable to the individual states. Historically,
the liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights were
originally not applicable to state laws. Beginning in
1897, however, the Supreme Court began to apply
provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states via the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To
muddy the issue, gun-control proponents have
purposely confused due process clause incorporation
cases with earlier cases that rejected the notion that the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment applied Bill of Rights liberties to the
states.
The U.S. Supreme Court in United States vs.
Cruikshank (1876) and Presser vs. Illinois (1886) held
that the Second Amendment (and the right of assembly
embodied in the First Amendment) did not apply to the
states by virtue of the privileges and immunities
clause. The right of assembly was later applied to the
states via the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in De Jonge vs. Oregon (1937); the Court
has yet to examine the Second Amendment in this
context, however. This sleight of hand with case law is
a preferred tactic of gun-control advocates, who have
neither historical fact nor public policy on their side.
As for the assault-weapons debate, the FBI's 1991
Uniform Crime Report states that only 3.7 percent of
all homicides in the United States were perpetrated
with rifles of any kind. The report also states that no
more than eight-tenths of 1 percent of all homicides
were perpetrated by criminals using rifles that utilized
military calibers - and not all rifles that utilize military
calibers are "assault weapons." In fact, the 1992
Uniform Crime Report reveals that more people were
beaten to death in that year -- 1, 114 -- than were killed
by rifles of any kind -- 698. More recently, Joseph
Constance, deputy chief of police in Trenton, N.J.,
stated that "my officers are more likely to confront an
escaped tiger from the local zoo than to confront an
assault rifle in the hands of a drug-crazed killer on the
streets."
The reason criminals do not use assault weapons
is simple and quite logical -- lack of concealability.
Yet, the media continues to perpetuate the myth that
assault weapons are the instrument of choice for street
gangs and drive-by assassins.
Gun-control proponents also attack concealed
carry laws. According to the 1992 FBI Uniform Crime
Report, however, the total violent crime rate is 26
percent higher in states with restrictive concealed carry
laws versus states with lenient laws; the homicide rate
is 49 percent higher; the robbery rate is 58 percent
higher.
When Florida enacted a more lenient law in 1987,
it had a murder rate 36 percent above the national
average. By 1991, Florida's murder rate had
plummeted to below the national average, where it
remains today. While there is no way to prove that
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freely allowing citizens to carry firearms by itself
reduced the murder rate in Florida, one thing is very
clear: the law did not act to increase the murder rate, as
foes of the law predicted. In fact, while Florida issued
204,108 permits over a six-year period, only 17 --
eight-thousands of 1 percent -- were revoked because
licensees later committed crimes (not necessarily
violent) in which guns were present (but not
necessarily used). Criminologist Gary Kleck reports
that while approximately 579,000 violent crimes are
committed with guns each year, Americans use
firearms for self-defense more than 2.1 million times
annually. In other words, for every crime committed
with a firearm, at least 3.6 crimes are prevented by a
law-abiding armed citizen. This result speaks for itself
Thomas Jefferson (quoting Cesare Beccaria) once
wrote that "laws that forbid the carrying of arms . .
disarm only those who are neither inclined nor
determined to commit crimes. Such laws make things
worse for the assaulted and better for the assailants;
they serve rather to encourage than to prevent
homicides, for an unarmed man may be attacked with
greater confidence than an armed man."
The rampant violent crime occurring in our
gun-controlled urban centers certainly proves this
timeless wisdom to be correct.
Mr. Kumeta is a San Diego County lawyer who
writes on matters concerning constitutional law and
public policy.
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94-1904 RADIO ASSOCIATION DEFENDING
AIRWAVE RIGHTS INC. v. DEPT. OF
TRANSPORTATION
Ban on radar detectors in commercial vehicles.
Ruling below (CA 6, 47 F.3d 794):
Federal Highway Administration did not ex-
ceed its authority in issuing rule that prohibits
use of radar detectors in commercial motor vehi-
cles without first finding that use of such devices
causes or contributes to accidents, because intent
of rule was to bring drivers into compliance with
posted speed limits, studies showed that drivers
with radar detectors were more likely to speed,
and FHA made finding that severity of accidents
that do occur increases with speed; rule is not
arbitrary or capricious on ground that it did not
assess impact on traffic safety of ban restricted to
only one class of vehicles, on ground that evi-
dence did not show that radar detectors increase
traffic safety by helping drivers maintain safe
speed of traffic, or on ground that agency re-
versed, without explanation, it prior stance in
opposition to rule banning radar detectors; record
supports finding that drivers with radar detectors
are more likely to speed, agency demonstrated
that accident severity increases with speed, and
comments received during rule-making process
prompted agency to see national aspect of safety
issues involved, thus prompting change of atti-
tude that had been based on federalism concerns;
FHA's decision to issue rule-making was not
improperly influenced by congressional pressure,
because appropriations bill provision on subject
simply directed agency to publish notice of rule-
making in interest of soliciting comments and
testimony, displeasure later voiced by Senate
committee addressed only fact that agency had
not yet taken action, and, in any event, congres-
sional comments on issue were not improper;
rule's limitation of ban to commercial vehicles
only, without regulating other vehicles, does not
violate Fifth Amendment's equal protection guar-
antee, because Congress, through enactment of
1984 Safety Act, expressed specific concern for
safe operation of commercial vehicles on inter-
state highways, and different physical character-
istics of such vehicles, which are much larger and
heavier than other vehicles, render them not simi-
larly situated to other vehicles for equal protec-
tion purposes.
Questions presented: (1) Was constitutionally
required separation of powers between coordinate
branches of federal government breached by con-
gressional enactment of rider to 1992 Dept. of
Transportation Appropriations Act, which re-
quired FHA-executive branch agency-to insti-
tute rule-making to ban radar detectors in com-
mercial motor vehicles, when FHA had twice
refused to initiate this rule-makine because it had
determined that rule was not justified upon its
professional review of all safety data and was
prohibited by Executive Order 12,621, which gov-
erned its actions? (2) Consistent with strictures
of Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC 706,
and provisions of Motor Carrier Safety Act, 49
USC App. 2505(c)(2). which prohibits unneces-
sary pre-emption of state laws, may "displeasure"
of Senate Appropriations Committee properly re-
sult in rule-making banning radar detectors in
commercial motor vehicles, which superseded leg-islative determination of 40 states that had reject-
ed radar detector bans? (3) Did FHA's unex-
plained reversal of its position in response to rider
enacted to appropriations bill governing its bud-
get ignore mandated evaluation of cost of regula-
tion, including cost to 50 states in enforcement of
administrative ban, and result in unfunded ad-
ministrative mandate to 50 states, which Con-
gress had refused to impose by enacting legisla-
tion banning use of radar detectors in commercial
motor vehicles? (4) Is FHA's rule, which makes
no assessment of threshold issue of whether radar
detectors cause or contribute to risk of commer-
cial motor vehicle accidents, which fails to evalu-
ate effect of rule itself upon speed distributions
within overall traffic stream and risk of commer-
cial motor vehicle accidents, which does not ad-
dress purported efficacy of rule in light of ac-
knowledged commercial motor vehicle crash data
regarding heavy trucks, which assumes efficacy
of detector bans to be imposed upon states that
have refused to ban detectors, and which reverses
without explanation or response to comments that
it solicited, FHA's repeated professional judg-
ment that no rule banning radar detectors should
issue, arbitrary and capricious?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/18/95, by Steven
P Resnick and W Kevin Reynolds, both of
Annapolis, Md.
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PUTTING TRAFFIC SAFETY ON THE RADAR SCREEN
Detector Companies Change Their Pitch for D.C. and VA
The Washington Post
Copyright 1995
Monday, June 26, 1995
Warren Brown
Washington Post Staff Writer
Radar detector companies have found a new way
to lobby for legalization of their devices in the only
two U.S. jurisdictions in which they are outlawed --
the District of Columbia and Virginia.
The detector companies are selling safety.
If the District and Virginia accept that pitch, it
could mean rejuvenated sales for an industry that has
long labored under a scofflaw image.
U.S. radar detector sales totaled about $300
million last year, according to estimates from the
Radio Association Defending Airwave Rights, the
industry's lobbying group. That's $100 million less
than the industry made in 1986.
Getting Virginia and the District to approve
detectors would not, alone, make up that loss. But it
would provide a "halo effect," legitimizing the detector
industry's new safety message across the nation,
industry officials said.
For the moment, the industry is concentrating on
Virginia, where it believes it has some legislative
support for a new line of detectors manufactured by
Cincinnati Microwave Inc. and Cobra Electronics
Corp., two of the nation's biggest radar detector
companies.
The companies are trying to counter a shift in
consumer thinking that threatens to further weaken its
sales.
Radar detectors are used by drivers to track police
radar and avoid speed traps. But nowadays, "you don't
have as many people as interested in speeding as they
are in safety," said Jacques Robinson, president and
chief executive of Cincinnati Microwave Inc.
Only 20 million of the estimated 175,000 million
passenger vehicles on U.S. roads are equipped with
radar detectors, Robinson said. The industry could
double the number of detector users if it succeeds in
selling safety, "which is more appealing to an aging
baby boomer population," he said.
Critics, including some in law enforcement and the
insurance industry, said radar detectors promote
speeding and help cause traffic accidents. That is why
they are outlawed in Virginia and the District.
But officials at Cincinnati Microwave and Cobra
Electronics Corp., a Chicago-based consumer
electronics company, believe the safety message could
overcome opposition to their detectors in those holdout
jurisdictions.
"Our whole idea now is to turn away from evading
speed detection to promoting traffic safety," said Steve
Yanklowitz, chief operating officer of Cobra.
To that end, Cobra has developed a radar detector
equipped with what it calls a Safety Alert System.
Cincinnati Microwave, with some technical assistance
from Cobra, has developed a similar system.
The Safety Alert System works like this: Police
and other emergency vehicles are equipped with an
emergency-signal transmitting device, made either by
Cobra or Cincinnati Microwave. The signal
automatically switches on with an emergency vehicle's
blinking warning lights.
Civilian vehicles equipped with radar detectors
can pick up the emergency signal within a mile from
the point of transmission.
A new generation of "smart" detectors produced
by Cobra and Cincinnati Microwave also can flash a
liquid crystal display "emergency vehicle" warning,
and relay other signals specifying the kind of
emergency vehicle involved.
The result is that both drivers and officials
involved in an emergency are warned of one another's
presence, said Robinson of Cincinnati Microwave.
"That means 'Safety Alert' can help save lives. It
tells the driver to slow down. It prevents traffic
accidents, which kill more police officers than guns,"
Robinson said.
That message is beginning to win some support
among lawmakers and law-enforcement officials in
Virginia. For example, Chief William Lewis of
Virginia's Cape Charles Police Department has been
testing the Cobra and Cincinnati Microwave Safety
Alery System devices, and is a fan.
"From the minute I began testing them, I fell in
love with them," Lewis said of the new radar systems.
"It's a fact that when one person with a detector slows
down, everybody around him slows down."
That speed reduction can save the life of a police
officer or emergency medical official working a traffic
accident, Lewis said.
Lewis, who said he receives no compensation
from the radar detector industry, has spoken to officials
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in the Virginia Department of Transportation urging
them to examine the Cobra and Cincinnati Microwave
systems. If such an examination leads to the overturn
of Virginia's ban on radar detectors, "that's fine with
me," Lewis said.
But it isn't fine with Joan Claybrook, executive
director of Washington-based Public Citizen, a public
interest group.
Claybrook's organization has helped lead
opposition to radar detectors. She said she sees
nothing in the Cobra and Cincinnati Microwave
developments to soften that approach.
As long as the detectors still can be used to detect
and evade police radar, companies that make those
devices "have blood on their hands," Claybrook said.
"There is no purpose for radar detectors other than
to violate the national speed law," which still limits
speeds to 55 mph on interstate highways in urban
areas, Claybrook said. Obedience to that law "is what
save lives," she said.
"We're hopeful, because of the promise of Safety
Alert, that the Virginia Legislature will be willing to
overturn the ban on radar detectors. And we hope that
Ms. Claybrook will take notice of the fact that many
law enforcement agencies are very receptive to this
technology," said Cobra Vice President John Pohl.
Cobra and Cincinnati Microwave officials said
that 29 police jurisdictions nationwide have accepted
their Safety Alert System.
Pohl said Safety Alert's supporters are so
confident their technology will win friends in Virginia
that they are staying away from using what he calls a
"tempting side issue" to promote their cause.
That issue has to do with guns, specifically the
Virginia Assembly's vote in February to allow
"law-abiding citizens" to carry licensed concealed
weapons, such as a handgun in the glove compartment
of a car.
Permitting citizens to carry concealed weapons
while outlawing radar detectors, which often sit in
clear view atop vehicle dashboards, "is hypocritical, to
say the least," said Michael Churchman, president of
Rocky Mountain Radar in Littleton, Colo.
Churchman's company makes radar devices of a
different type. They are designed to help drivers evade
police radar by canceling out the police radar signal
altogether.
Claybrook agreed that the Virginia Assembly
seems to be sending contrasting public safety messages
by allowing concealed guns and banning detectors.
But she said that no one in the detector industry
should take comfort in that agreement. "The detector
industry and the National Rifle Association,"
Claybrook said, "to me, they're all the same."
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94-1734 LANSING DAIRY INC. v. GLICKMAN
Federal milk price regulations-Judicial defer7
ence to agency interpretation of statute.
Ruling below (Lansing Dairy Inc. v. Espy,
CA 6, 39 F.3d 1339, 63 LW 2309):
Secretary of agriculture's interpretation of
1937 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act to
allow milk marketing order location adjustments
in price pursuant to 7 USC 608c(5) without
considering economic criteria specified in 7 USC
608c(18) as controlling minimum prices fixed for
milk under marketing orders is permissible; that
secretary's interpretation may be different from
that followed in past is irrelevant so long as
current interpretation is reasonable and does not
conflict with unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.
Questions presented: (1) Does Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984), require judicial deference
to agency's reversal of its longstanding interpreta-
tion of statute that it administers, when agency
has neither acknowledged that it changed its
interpretation nor provided reasoned explanation
of change? (2) Is court, in applying Chevron,
required to draw reasonable inferences from stat-
utory text to determine intent of Congress?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/21/95, by Steven
J. Rosenbaum, Robert A. Long Jr., Thomas L.
Cubbage III, and Covington & Burling, all of
Washington, D.C., and John H. Vetne, and Blod-
gett, Makechnie & Vetne, both of Newburyport,
Mass.
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